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THE UNPROPOSED SOLUTION TO CHAPTER 11 REFORM:




The United States Bankruptcy Code ("Bankruptcy Code") was enacted
in 1978.' In that year alone, approximately 8,000 firms sought to reorganize
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.2 By 1992, that number had risen
to a high of nearly 24,000.'
The Bankruptcy Code is substantially more "user friendly" than its
predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.' Under the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, corporations seeking to reorganize were required to demonstrate they
were insolvent or unable to pay their debts as they matured.5 Furthermore,
once having filed for reorganization, managers of large publicly held
corporations were required to turn their operations over to trustees.6
In drafting Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress sought to
conserve corporate assets by directing managers of financially troubled
companies toward reorganization rather than liquidation.7 It accomplished
this, in part, by eliminating the threshold requirements for filing for
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law; former partner, Dykema
Gossett, Detroit, Michigan. I am grateful for the comments of Lawrence Ponoroff on an earlier
draft of this article as well as for the research assistance of Kathleen Heritage, Gregory Feldman,
Louise Maehler and Michelle Howley. Financial support was provided by Detroit College of
Law.
1. United States Bankruptcy Code, Pub. L. No. 95-595, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1978)), as amended by The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat.) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code]. The
Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978 and became effective in 1979.
2. Bankruptcy Surge, CORP. FIN. WK., Mar. 9, 1992, at 5.
3. Id. Bankruptcy filings have decreased since 1992. Nation wide bankruptcy filings have
decreased during only four other periods over the last 30 years (1967-1968, 1971-1973, 1976-
1978, and 1983-1984). These declines each lasted between six and eleven quarters, with filings
bottoming out at between 10% and 20% below peak volume. If history repeats itself, national
filing levels may drop to between 800,000 and 900,000 cases per year. This would still be more
than double the number of case filings of any year prior to 1985, and higher than the volume of
cases filed as recently as 1990. XII AM. BANKR. INST. J. 11 (1993).
4. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1976) (repealed 1978); 11 U.S.C. § 723 (1976) (repealed 1978); 11
U.S.C. § 823 (1976) (repealed 1978).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1976) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (1978)).
7. Peter Passell, Critics of Bankruptcy Law See Inefficiency and Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,
1993, at 1. See also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179 ("The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are used
for production in the industry for which they were designed are more valuable than those same
assets sold for scrap"); 123 CONG. REC. H35,444 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1977) (statement of Rep.
Rodino) ("For businesses, the bill facilitates organization, protecting investments and jobs").
1
Burr: The Unproposed Solution to Chapter 11 Reform: Assessing Managemen
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1994
114 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25
reorganization and by allowing corporate managers to retain control of the
debtor after filing
Unfortunately, Congress' attempt to conserve corporate cash has instead
contributed to corporate waste.9 By allowing corporate management to file
for bankruptcy when the corporation is otherwise solvent and to remain in
control of the corporation indefinitely, Chapter 11 invites abuse by managers
seeking to retain their jobs.'" Furthermore, because Chapter 11 limits the
downside of any business disaster, it encourages managers to issue excessive
debt and take increased risks.1'
Three well publicized Chapter 11 proceedings illustrate this strategic
abuse of Chapter 11.'L In In re Johns-Manville Corporation, Johns-Manville
Corporation filed for relief under Chapter 11 in the midst of an avalanche of
lawsuits initiated by persons injured by exposure to asbestos. 3 In In re
Continental Airlines, Continental Airlines reorganized during wage negotia-
tions with its labor unions.'4 In In re Texaco, Texaco declared bankruptcy
after Pennzoil won a $10.5 billion jury verdict against it.'5
None of these cases involved a failed business. Instead, each case
involved a corporation with nonfatal business problems for which bankruptcy
provided a convenient solution. 6 Johns-Manville filed for bankruptcy to
deny punitive damages to asbestos claimants and to stay collection of asbestos
damage awards, while it settled with its insurers. 7  Continental used
8. KEVIN J. DELANEY, STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCY: How CORPORATIONS AND CREDITORS USE
CHAPTER 11 TO THEIR ADVANTAGE 30, 122, 160-68 (1992).
9. See Passell, supra note 7, at 1; DELANEY, supra note 8 (reviewing the bankruptcies of
Johns-Manville Corporation, Continental Airlines Corporation and Texaco Incorporation to
support the arguments that large corporations view bankruptcy as a legitimate business strategy
and that bankruptcy has become a political system for allocating scarce resources); Michael
Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101 YALE L. J. 1043
(1992) (presenting empirical data to support the argument that existing bankruptcy law falls to
provide managers with appropriate incentives to allocate corporate resources to their highest
valued uses).
10. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 9, at 1052.
11. Id.
12. See Passell, supra note 7 and DELANEY, supra note 8, for interesting discussions of
"strategic" bankruptcies. These cases, as does this article, primarily involve pre-petition risk
taking.
13. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984), appeal denied, 39 B.R.
234 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1988).
14. In re Continental Airlines Corp., 60 B.R. 903 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
15. In re Texaco Inc., 81 B.R. 813 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
16. DELANEY, supra note 8, at 60-160 (describing at length how Johns-Manville Corporation
solved asbestos liability through bankruptcy, Continental Airlines Corporation used bankruptcy
to abrogate union contracts, and Texaco Incorporated used bankruptcy to frustrate a business
rival).
17. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. at 727.
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bankruptcy to gain leverage over labor negotiations." Texaco used Chapter
11 to delay Pennzoil's attempt to collect its judgment, thereby persuading
Pennzoil to settle for a lesser amount.'
As a result of these types of strategic bankruptcies, there has been a
clamor for reform of Chapter I1 20 Academics call for the repeal of Chapter
11 and its replacement with market driven forces or perfect market alterna-
tives.2' Meanwhile, Congress struggles with stop gap measures.22
None of the proposed "fixes" are likely to solve the dilemma of Chapter
1 1 abuse, however. The reason for this is that none of the proposals
encourage responsible corporate management.
The failure to address this issue may be traced, in part, to the history of
the Bankruptcy Code. Exactly what government policy Congress sought to
accomplish when it passed the Bankruptcy Code has been the source of
numerous debates.23 Nevertheless, at its core the Bankruptcy Code is a debt
collection and asset distribution system.24
Conversely, in other countries, bankruptcy legislation is an instrument for
implementing government economic policy. One such country is the People's
Republic of China ("PRC").
25
18. See In re Continental Airlines Corp., 60 B.R. at 903. After Continental, Congress
adopted 11 U.S.C. § 1113, restricting rejection of collective bargaining agreements. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1113 (1984). In the bankruptcy cases that have occurred since Continental involving union
contracts, the courts have generally looked at whether rejection was necessary to permit a
successful reorganization. DELANEY, supra note 8, at 125.
19. See In re Texaco Inc., 81 B.R. at 813.
20. For recent scholarly condemnation of Chapter 11, see Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note
9, at 1058 (concluding that the social costs of bankruptcy have increased under the Bankruptcy
Code); Edith H. Jones, Chapter 11: A Death Penalty for Debtor and Creditor Interests, 77
CORNELL L. REv. 1088, 1088 (1992) ("[T]here is very little good to be accomplished either from
a social standpoint or in the particular case as it appears before our courts, under the rubric of
Chapter 11"). For more popular critiques, see Howard Gleckman, Why Chapter 11 Needs to Be
Rewritten, Bus. WEEK, May 18, 1992, at 116; Passell, supra note 7. A number of factors
contributed to the problems surrounding Chapter 11, but the publicity afforded the "strategic
bankruptcies" fueled the perception of the need for reform. See Passell, supra note 7.
21. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Markets, Courts and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy
Theory, 1993 WIs. L. REv. 465, 471 [hereinafter Skeel, Brave New World]; David A. Skeel, Jr.,
The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV.
461, 484 (1992) [hereinafter Skeel, Corporate Voting]. See discussion infra part III.
22. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994)
[hereinafter Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994]. Congress passed H.R. 5116 on October 7, 1994.
On October 22, 1994, President Clinton signed the bill into law. See discussion infra part III(D).
23. Compare Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987)
[hereinafter Warren, Policy] and Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy in an Imperfect World,
92 MICH. L.R. 336 (1993) [hereinafter Warren, Imperfect World] with Douglas G. Baird, Loss
Distribution, Forum Shopping and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 815
(1987) [hereinafter Baird, Loss Distribution].
24. See, e.g., Max Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1940);
Warren, Policy, supra note 23, at 778.
25. The terms "China," "Chinese" and the abbreviation "PRC" refer to the People's Republic
of China in this article.
1994]
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The PRC adopted its Enterprise Bankruptcy Law in 1986.26 Under the
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, bankruptcy cases are administered with an
emphasis on social and economic effects rather than the settlement of debtor
creditor disputes.27 The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, a device for requiring
more efficient management of state owned enterprises,28 features the
application of sanctions to those individuals responsible for business
failures.29 It also limits the use of bankruptcy to enterprises which are
insolvent and the overall term of bankruptcy to two years. 0
A comparison of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law and the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 with Chapter 11 suggests a variety of options available to Congress
in reforming Chapter 11 to discourage abuse by publicly held corporations.3'
Section I of this article examines the background, legislative history, purpose,
scope, threshold, reorganization and corporate governance provisions of the
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law. Section II reviews the comparable provisions of
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section
III discusses the academic and political responses to the crisis of Chapter 11
reform. Section IV discusses proposals for Chapter 11 reform premised on
encouraging management responsibility for business performance and
26. The Law of the People's Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy was adopted on
December 2, 1986 by the 18th Session of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's
Congress and promulgated on December 2, 1986 [hereinafter Enterprise Bankruptcy Law]. The
English translation utilized in this article is from the CHINA LAW YEARBOOK 1987, 83 (1989)
[hereinafter YEARBOOK]. See Henry R. Zheng, Bankruptcy Law of The People's Republic of
China: Principle, Procedure and Practice, 4 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 683 (1986) (translating
the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law into English); Douglas G. Boshkoff & Yongxini Song, China's
New Bankruptcy Law: A Translation and Brief Introduction, 61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 359 (1987)
(translating the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law into English).
27. Pan Qi, Bankruptcy Law: A Newborn in China, CHINA L. REP. 41, 42 (1987).
28. Boshkoff & Song, supra note 26, at 361.
29. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, art. 42, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 87.
30. Id. arts. 3, 17, translated in CHINA LAW YEARBOOK, at 83, 84. Article 17 provides that
the application must occur within three months of approval of the petition and the reorganization
may not last more than two years. However, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law does not prescribe
a time within which the reorganization agreement must be negotiated and approved. Therefore,
it is possible that the total delay will exceed two years and three months. See Boshkoff & Song,
supra note 26, at 360 n.8.
31. This article concerns only those firms that are publicly traded. Of course, closely held
firms are more common in bankruptcy. LoPucki and Whitford note that only seventy-two
publicly held corporations claiming assets of $100 million or more filed Chapter I I petitions
between October 1979 and March 1988. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 38 CORNELL L. REv. 597,
602 (1993) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Patterns]. In more recent years, there have been
between ten to twenty filings of large publicly held corporations per year. Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly
Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669, 675 (1993) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford,
Corporate Governance]. However, the total dollars involved in these cases may equal or exceed
those cases involving closely held corporations. Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chaper
11, 36 J. L. & ECON. 633, 637 (1993) [hereinafter Baird, Revisiting Auctions]. Furthermore, it
is only in publicly held corporations that there is a separation of ownership and control. An
individual shareholder may control a large fraction of the stock in a public company.
Nevertheless, unlike the closely held corporation, the ownership and operation of the firm are not
intertwined. Id. at 637.
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assessing management responsibility for business failure.32
I. THE ENTERPRISE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA ("PRC")
A. Background
In the late 1970's, the People's Republic of China ("PRC") launched into
economic reform.33 The theme of this reform was to diminish the role of
state planning, to enhance the autonomy of, and the competition among,
business enterprises and to provide direct economic incentives for improved
performance to enterprises and employees.34 In short, to break the "big rice
bowl."'35
For many years, the PRC was plagued by state enterprises which ran at
heavy losses. 6 The prevailing practice was to write off the losses through
state budget appropriations or to take administrative measures against the
enterprises.37 In the latter situation, the state would merge the enterprise or
change its business operations.3" The employees in the enterprise would
remain unaffected, continuing to receive wages and even bonuses.39 These
measures were known as "Guan, Ting, Bing, Zhuan." 0
The practice of "Guan, Ting, Bing, Zhaun" hindered economic reform.4
The state budgetary compensation for losses encouraged poor performance.42
Administrative measures failed to impose the direct negative impact of the
32. The terms "corporate management", "management" and "managers" refer to officers,
directors and business managers in operational control of the corporation prior to filing for
Chapter 11. Chapter 11 gives these "managers" a central role in determining the fate of those
parties who hold a financial stake based on a prebankruptcy investment. At least, as compared
to creditors and other direct investors, managers may have no direct personal claim to or stake
in the estate other than in using its operations to retain their ongoing salary and benefit packages.
To the extent that they are biased or interested parties, their interest runs in the direction of
maintaining the existing business as an ongoing entity. Raymond T. Nimmer & Richard B.
Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance: Fiduciary Duties, Business Judgment, Trustees and
Exclusivity, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 21, 24-5 (1989). See also FED. R. BANKR. P. 9001(5) (focusing
on persons in operating control).
33. In 1978, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee adopted a new policy of
invigorating the domestic economy and opening to the outside world. Qi, supra note 27, at 42
n.11.
34. Zheng, supra note 26, at 685.
35. "Big Rice Bowl" is a Chinese metaphor meaning that the state feeds all enterprises and
every enterprise has a share in getting benefits from the state regardless of its contribution. Qi,
supra note 27, at 42 n. 12 (citing A CHINESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 125 (1979)).
36. Qi, supra note 27, at 41.
37. Zheng, supra note 26, at 685-86.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. "Guan, Ting, Bing, Zhuan" can be roughly translated as close, stop, merge, transfer.
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enterprise's losses on the responsible managerial personnel.43
The practice also affected reform in other areas. First, it negatively
impacted the goal of enhancing the independence of enterprises in business
management."' Enterprises issued bonuses and increased fringe benefits
even when they sustained a substantial loss.45 As the system did not impose
direct financial obligations proportionate to the increased autonomy of
enterprises, there was no economic deterrent to prevent abuse.46 Second, it
negatively impacted the adoption of fluctuating interest rates to control
borrowing and capital investment.47 The government was unable to prevent
enterprises, not concerned with losses, from borrowing at high interest
rates.48
By the early 1980s, it was clear that, unless action was taken to relate the
economic success of enterprises and individuals to their business performance,
continuing economic reform would be undermined.49 In 1983, the Technol-
ogy and Economics Research Center of the State Council conducted a study
on technological progress in the PRC. s0 The study concluded that the only
way to accelerate technological progress in the PRC was to enact a bankrupt-
cy law to weed out inefficient enterprises. 1
The possibility of enacting comprehensive bankruptcy legislation was
enhanced by the adoption of a revised Constitution52 and the General
Principles of the Civil Code 3 in 1982 and 1986, respectively. The General
Principles of the Civil Code, in particular, provided the basis for the
enactment of the bankruptcy legislation. The civil code states that an
enterprise may cease operation when that enterprise is declared bankrupt and
that representatives of an enterprise may assume responsibility for civil
liabilities of that enterprise. 4
43. Id.




48. Id. at 687-88.
49. Id. at 688.
50. Ta-Kuang Chang, The Making of the Chinese Bankruptcy Law: A Study in the Chinese
Legislative Process, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333, 336 (1987).
51. Id
52. P.R.C. CONST. (1983), translated in The Constitution of the People's Republic ofChina,
3 CONST. COMMENTARY 5 (1988) [hereinafter Constitution].
53. General Principles of Civil Law of People's Republic of China (adopted by the Fourth
Session of the Sixth National People's Congress on April 12, 1986, promulgated by the
President's Order No. 37, effective January 1, 1987) [hereinafter Civ. Code], translation in
Whitmore Gray & Henry R. Zheng, General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic
of China, 34 AM. J. COM. L. 715 (1986).
54. Chin Kim, The Modern Chinese Legal System, 61 TtL. L. REv. 1413, 1448 (1987)
(citing Civ. Code, supra note 53, arts. 45, 48, 49).
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B. Legislative History
The PRC does not subscribe to the theories of stare decisis or res
judicata." The popular philosophy is that "as the legislature is the represen-
tative body of the people, it should decide how the law should be applied to
the people."56 As a result, legislative history is the primary source of legal
interpretation in the PRC. 7
Under the Constitution, "basic laws" of the PRC must be passed by the
National People's Congress ("NPC")." All laws, other than those passed
by the NPC, must be passed by the National People's Congress Standing
Committee ('cNPC-SC"). 9 In practice, NPC representatives propose to the
NPC that a law should be enacted. The actual drafting of the law and its
introduction to the NPC or the NPC-SC is performed by other government
departments, such as the State Council.60
The first formal step in the enactment of the bankruptcy law was a
proposal ("Proposal Draft") made by NPC representatives in 1984 to the
second session of the sixth NPC.6' The Proposal Draft was sent to the
Economic Legislation Research Center ("ELRC") of the State Council.62 In
December 1984, the State Council approved the formation of a bankruptcy
law drafting task force under the leadership of the ELRC, the State Economic
Commission and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce.6"
The drafting task force finalized the Law of the PRC on Enterprise
Bankruptcy ("Opinion Solicitation Draft") in September, 1985. 4  The
Opinion Solicitation Draft was circulated for comment to officials in central
55. Deborah L. Bayles, The Reunification of China: An Examination of the Legal Systems
of the People's Republic of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, 19 DENV. J. INT L L. & POL'Y 443,
449 (1991); Kim, supra note 54, at 1442.
56. Bayles, supra note 55, at 449.
57. Id. (citing Fung, The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
Peoples' Republic of China: Problems of Interpretation, 37 INT'L. & COMP. L. Q. 701, 703(1988). See also P.R.C. CONST., art. 67, translated in Constitution, supra note 52, at 18).
58. Chang, supra note 50, at 336. The National People's Congress is China's elected
legislature. For a discussion of "basic laws" see W. DAYING, ET AL., THE PROBLEM OF CHINESE
SOCIALIST LEGISLATION (1984), cited in CHANG, supra note 50, at 336 n. 11.
59. Id. The precise scope of legislative powers of the NPC and NPC-SC has not been clearly
defined and practice has not been consistent. Id. at 336 n. 11.
60. Id. at 339. The State Council is composed of the heads of central government ministries
and is empowered to enact a wide range of regulations. Peng Xiaohua, Characteristics of
China's First Bankruptcy Law, 28 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 373, 381 n.33 (1987).
61. Chang, supra note 50, at 339-40. A separate bankruptcy regulation applies exclusively
to foreign investment enterprises. Bankruptcy Regulations of the Shenzhen Special Economic
Zones for Foreign Related Corporations, adopted at the 23d Session of the Standing Committee
of the sixth People's Congress of Guangdong Province on November 29, 1986 [hereinafter
Shenzhen Act]. See Zheng, supra note 26, at 719, 725-28, for an analysis of the Shenzhen Act.
62. Chang, supra note 50, at 337.
63. Id. at 339-40; Zheng, supra note 26, at 694.
64. Chang, supra note 50, at 342.
1994]
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government agencies as well as in the provincial and municipal govern-
ments.6 ' The drafting task force then compiled the comments on the
Opinion Solicitation Draft and formulated a draft law. The Law of the PRC
on Enterprise Bankruptcy ("Draft Law") was approved by the Standing
Committee of the State Council on January 31, 1986.66
The Draft Law was presented by the Vice Chairman of the State
Economic Commission on behalf of the State Council to the sixteenth session
of the sixth NPC-SC in June 1986 ("June Session").67 The Draft Law was
presented with the caveat that it would not be put to a vote until the next
NPC-SC session in late August.
68
Meanwhile, in early August, certain staff members of the NPC-SC held
meetings with lawyers from the United States and Europe.69 These staff
members requested information on foreign bankruptcy laws related to issues
which were the subject of amendments made at later sessions of the NPC-
SC.7° Of particular interest was the subject of encouraging corporate
efficiency by punishing unsuccessful managers.7 ' Chinese drafters expressed
disappointment upon learning that the bankruptcy laws of the United States
and many western European nations do not include provisions for punishing
bankrupt companies' managers.72
Although the Draft Law was scheduled to be adopted in late August 1986
at the seventeenth session of the NPC-SC ("August Session"),73 it was
deferred to a later session. This delay was due to the NPC's inability to
agree on the implementation of the system.74
The NPC Law Committee and the NPC Committee on Finance and
Economics then invited government officials to attend a symposium on the
Draft Law.75 Following further discussion, the NPC Law Committee
ultimately proposed a number of revisions to the Draft Law. It was finally
concluded that with those revisions, the Draft Law was feasible.
76
On December 2, 1986, during its eighteenth session, the NPC-SC passed
65. Id.; Zheng, supra note 26, at 694.
66. Chang, supra note 50, at 343; Zheng, supra note 26, at 694.
67. Chang, supra note 50, at 345-46.
68. Id. at 346. Presentment of a law in the session before it is to be put to a vote is the
general practice of the NPC-SC. Id.
69. Id. at 347.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 366.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 347.
74. Id at 348; Zheng, supra note 26, at 695.
75. Chang, supra note 50, at 349-50.
76. Id. at 349-50; Zheng, supra note 26, at 695.
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the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law."' The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law was pro-
claimed law on the same day.78 However, its effective date was delayed
pending the adoption of related legislation.79 The Enterprise Bankruptcy
Law finally became effective in November 1988.'0
C. Purpose
The hortatory language of Chinese laws has greater legal significance
than the hortatory language of laws in the United States and other western
77. Chang, supra note 50, at 350-51; Zheng, supra note 26, at 696. As adopted the
law is divided into six chapters. Chapter one sets forth the "general principles" of the
law, including the law's purpose, its scope of application, the "threshold" of
bankruptcy, and circumstances which permit exceptions to the law's general
provisions and suspension of the bankruptcy procedure. Chapter two describes the
procedure for filing petitions of bankruptcy, the rights of creditors and debtors to file
petitions for the debtor's bankruptcy, and the procedure courts are to follow in
handling such petitions. Cha.pter three describes the creditor's conference which
follows the filing of a petition for bankruptcy. Chapter four provides for a
reconciliation-and-readjustment procedure as an alternative to bankruptcy. Chapter
five includes provisions for entering a final declaration of bankruptcy and for
liquidation of the bankrupt enterprise's assets. Chapter six sets forth the date on
which and the conditions under which the bankruptcy law becomes effective. The
final chapter also provides for criminal and administrative penalties.
Xiaohua, supra note 60, at 375 n.7.
78. P.R.C. CONST., art. 80, translated in Constitution, supra note 52, at 20-21. Such
immediate effect given to a new law is in accordance with the PRC Constitution. Chang, supra
note 50, at 351.
79. Article 43 of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 26, provides that it shall be
implemented "three full months after the Law on Industrial Enterprises by the Whole People has
come into effect, and the specific plans and steps for the trial implementation stipulated by the
State Council." Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, art. 43, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at
87.
80. Cao Siyuan, Bumpy Road for China's Bankruptcy Law, NEWSL. OF INSOL INT'L, Nov.
1993, at 15. Since the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the PRC went into effect in 1988, courts
have handled fewer than 1,000 cases. Bankruptcies, limited to small companies, are often
shrouded in secrecy. Decisions are not reported and the cases themselves receive scant coverage
in the Chinese press. Sheila Tefft, Beiing Tries to Limit Slew of Bankruptcies, THE CHRISTIAN
SCL MONITOR, Aug. 11, 1994 at 9. Implementation has been hindered because of opposition
from workers, banks and local governments afraid of the social consequences of thousands of
unemployed. The obstacles to implementation include confusion over who owns state assets, how
to evaluate these assets and who is liable for the debts owed by bankrupt firms. Mark O'Neill,
China Heralds New Waves of State Bankruptcies, THE REUTER EUR. BUS. REP., Aug. 17, 1994.
Journalists report that western and Chinese analysts charge that the momentum of market
reforms is stalling under the staggering burden of state companies. Teffl, supra at 9.
Historically, officials have agreed that bankruptcy must be the answer but have insisted that the
country is not yet ready to deal with the consequences of economic restructuring and an
increasingly militant labor force. Teffi, supra at 9. However, in August 1994, Chinese officials
unveiled a bankruptcy experiment to take place in 18 industrial cities. The experiment is backed
by 7 billion yuan put into a special bankruptcy fund to cover the resulting losses of China's
banks. It is believed that the experiments will at last establish proper bankruptcy procedures in
China. China Stirs Its Sleeping Giants, ECON. NEWS., Aug. 27, 1994, at 53, Tony Walker,
China Plans Reform of State Enterprises, FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 5, 1994, at 4.
1994]
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legal systems." The preamble to the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law describes
the goals of the law, in descending order of importance:
This law is formulated in order to suit the development of the
socialist planned commodity economy and the needs of the reform of the
economic structure, to promote the automony of operation of enterprises,
owned by the whole people, to strengthen the economic responsibility
system and democratic management, to improve the condition of opera-
tions, to raise economic efficiency, and to protect the lawful rights and
interests of creditors and debtors.'
D. Scope
The scope of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law was heavily debated by
Chinese lawmakers. The two primary issues were "whether the law should
apply to enterprises with foreign investment, or just to Chinese enterprises
and if the latter, whether it should apply only to state enterprises, or
. . . also to collective enterprises and other types of Chinese economic
organizations. "I
The earliest drafts of the bankruptcy law applied to all enterprises in the
PRC.8 However, as divergent rules often govern Chinese enterprises and
foreign investment, difficulties arose in drafting a bankruptcy law capable of
addressing both kinds of entities' needs.' In addition, for some foreign
investors the drafts raised the possibility that their money-losing investments
in the PRC might be declared bankrupt with unanticipated results.' Of
particular concern were the provisions providing for the punishment of
management.' Thus, during the August Session of the NPC-SC, the Draft
Law was revised to apply only to Chinese enterprises.'
Similarly, both the Proposal Draft and the Opinion Solicitation Draft
applied to collective enterprises and individual enterprises,89 as well as to
81. Chang, supra note 50, at 365.
82. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, art. 1, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 83.
83. Chang, supra note 50, at 361.
84. Id; Zheng, supra note 26, at 696-97.
85. Chang, supra note 50, at 362.
86. Id.
87. "[Plunishment of management ... would be very difficult to apply to enterprises
involving foreign investment." Id.
88. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, art. 2, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 83. As
revised, the law applies only to Chinese state owned enterprises. But the Chinese government
has established a bankruptcy system for enterprises involving foreign investment. See, e.g.,
Shenzhen Act, supra note 61.
89. Chang, supra note 50, at 362-63. Collectively owned enterprises are under the leadership
of the local government, which provides their capital. However, local governments assume only
partial responsibility for the debts of the enterprises which they sponsor and control. In 1987,
there were approximately 360,000 collectively owned enterprises. Xiaohua, supra note 60, at
376.
10
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state owned enterprises.90 However, during the August Session, the Draft
Law was restricted to state owned enterprises. 9' The decision to restrict the
scope of bankruptcy law to state owned enterprises reflects the differences
among the enterprises. Government assumption of responsibility for their
losses make state owned enterprises "uniquely unable and unwilling to
respond to market signals. "I Further, efficient state owned enterprises are
crucial to the success of economic reforml because of the determinative
role that these large enterprises play in the economy. Finally, as only state
owned enterprises are able to transfer "potentially unlimited debts to the
central and provincial governments," state owned enterprises place a far




Another principal problem facing the drafters of the Enterprise
Bankruptcy Law was setting workable standards for defining the threshold
of bankruptcy. The earlier drafts of the bankruptcy law all contain varying
formulations of three general types of bankruptcy standards: ratio of
liabilities to assets, ratio of losses to assets, and timely payment of debts. 91
The standards of ratio of liabilities to assets and ratio of losses to assets
were eliminated from the Draft Law during the August Session.' The ratio
of liabilities or losses to assets standards were criticized because many
enterprises in the PRC have large amounts of debt. Hence, the standards
made an unacceptably large number of Chinese enterprises definitionally
bankrupt. 97
The standard which remains in the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law for the
threshold of bankruptcy is the timely payment of debts. 9 The Enterprise
90. Chang, supra note 50, at 362-363. State owned enterprises are industrial entities
established with state capital and accountable to the state. In 1987, state owned industrial
enterprises numbered 93,000. Xiaohua, supra note 60, at 375. Other types of enterprises include
township cooperative enterprises formed by individuals pooling their private funds, "sino-foreign
joint ventures, foreign owned enterprises and privately owned enterprises. There are relatively
few enterprises of these types." Id. at 376.
91. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, art. 2, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 83; Chang,
supra note 50, at 362-63.
92. Xiaohua, supra note 60, at 376.
93. Id. at 376-77.
94. Id. at 377; Chang, supra note 50, at 363.
95. Chang, supra note 50, at 358. The simplest definition of the liabilities to assets standard
is whether the debts of the enterprise exceed the total amount of its assets; the ratio of losses to
assets standard is a restriction against negative net worth or accumulated net losses; the timely
payment of debts standard is similar to the general standard for involuntary bankruptcies in the
United States found at 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1988). Chang, supra note 50, at 358-60.
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Bankruptcy Law provides that a bankrupt entity is one that has sustained
serious losses resulting from poor operations and management and cannot pay
debts that are due." The "resulting" language was carefully chosen. The
Proposal Draft defined "a bankrupt enterprise as one which, 'because of
mismanagement and serious deficit cannot repay debts which are due
... P,,,0 During NPC debates, the concern was raised that "many
troubled state owned enterprises' deficits were caused by ... excessive
government interference ..... ."101 The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law
reflects this concern and limits the definition of bankrupt enterprises to those
suffering from losses resulting from poor management.'°2
State owned enterprises are eligible for both voluntary and involuntary
bankruptcy.'0 3 However, the law imposes certain restrictions upon invol-
untary proceedings. State owned public utilities and enterprises of major
concern to the national economy, whose debts will be repaid by the govern-
ment, are not eligible for involuntary proceedings." Similarly, enterprises
that obtain a government guaranty and are able to repay their debts within six
months after initiation of bankruptcy are not eligible for involuntary
proceedings.'" Finally, bankruptcy proceedings will be suspended if the
reconciliation and readjustment procedure is initiated.'°6
F. Reorganization and Exclusivity
During the bankruptcy proceeding, the department in charge of the
debtor may petition the court for reorganization or "reconciliation and
readjustment." 0 7 The petition for reorganization must be filed within three
99. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, art. 3, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 83.
100. Xiaohua, supra note 60, at 377 (quoting Sona Rufen, Legal Committee Thinks Drafi of
Bankruptcy Law is Generally Feasible, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Nov. 16, 1986).
101. Id.
102. Id. The concept of poor management is not defined in the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law.
103. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, arts. 7-8, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 83-84.
Although the criteria for bankruptcy are inability to pay debts as well as sustaining losses due
to poor management, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law does not require a petitioner in an
involuntary bankruptcy proceeding to show that the debtor sustained serious loss due to
inappropriate management as a prerequisite to filing a bankruptcy petition. Rather, the Enterprise
Bankruptcy Law sets up a trigger mechanism allowing creditors to initiate bankruptcy
proceedings as long as the debtor fails to pay debts as they become due. Id. art. 7, translated
in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 83.
104. Id. art. 3(1), translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 83.
105. Id art. 3(2), translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 83.
106. Id. art. 3, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 83. If read literally, suspension
of the liquidation process in favor of reorganization is possible only in an involuntary bankruptcy.
See Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, art. 17, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 84-85. This
distinction between voluntary and involuntary proceedings is believed to be a drafting error.
Boshkoff & Song, supra note 26, at 363 n.24.
107. Id. art. 17, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 84-85. There are no separate
bankruptcy courts in the P.R.C. Bankruptcy cases are heard by the People's Court, the court of
general jurisdiction. Boshkoff & Song, supra note 26, at 363 n.29.
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months after the court has received the case.'08 The maximum period for
reorganization is two years.l°9
Once the petition for reorganization is accepted by the court, the
enterprise submits a draft agreement to a creditors' committee." 0 The
agreement includes a plan for rescheduling the repayment of debts."' If
the creditors accept the agreement and the court approves it, bankruptcy
proceedings are suspended."
The government authority responsible for filing the readjustment is
charged with overseeing the enterprise's reorganization program."' If the
debtor enterprise is able to repay its debts in accordance with the reorganiza-
tion agreement, the court will terminate bankruptcy proceedings. "i
4
However, the court will declare the enterprise bankrupt if it is unable to
repay its debts after two years. "' The court may also terminate reorgani-
zation and enter a declaration of bankruptcy if it finds that the enterprise has
not implemented the reconciliation agreement or that the enterprise has
violated rules proscribed by bankruptcy law." 6 Finally, the court may
enter a declaration of bankruptcy upon a showing by the creditors' committee
of deterioration of the financial status of the debtor. 117
Upon a declaration of bankruptcy, the case proceeds to liquidation. The
court establishes a liquidation group to take over the bankrupt enterprise."'
The group consists of representatives from the department in charge of the
debtor, government departments in charge of finance, and specialists in the
pertinent line of business, among others. " 9 The liquidation group has full
power to care for, liquidate, dispose, of and distribute the bankrupt es-
tate. 1t0
G. Corporate Governance: The Punishment of Management
The concept of bankruptcy law as a mechanism for punishing bankrupt
enterprises' managers was firmly embodied in the early drafts of the
108. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 26, art. 17, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note
26, at 84-85.
109. Id.
110. Id. art. 18, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 85.
111. Id.
112. Id. art. 19, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 85.
113. Id. art. 20, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 85.
114. Id. art. 22, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 85.
115. Id.
116. Id. art. 21, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 85.
117. Id.
118. Id. art. 24, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 85.
119. Id.
120. Id. The powers of the liquidation group are similar to those of a Chapter 7 trustee
under 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
1994]
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Enterprise Bankruptcy Law. 2' Under the Proposal Draft, the managers of
a failing enterprise which received a bankruptcy warning were to be instantly
removed. 12
Under the Opinion Solicitation Draft, fraud and misrepresentation were
punishable by prison terms of two to five years and the managers were
subject to other criminal penalties if the bankruptcy was caused by their
relinquishment of duty."5 Additionally, fines were to be assessed against
those primarily responsible for the bankruptcy as well as those who favored
one creditor over another." Finally, the Opinion Solicitation Draft
prohibited those leaders of the enterprise with responsibility for the
bankruptcy from taking another leadership position or operating another
enterprise for a period of three years."
An important issue at the August Session, however, concerned the
fairness of punishing managers of a bankrupt enterprise who have limited
autonomy in their management decisions." At the beginning of the
August Session, the NPC Law Committee recommended that the detailed
provisions on penalties found in the earlier drafts be replaced by a general
provision."17 Later debates in the NPC-SC on the autonomy of the enter-
prise recognized the dominant role that the government department in charge
of the enterprise plays in the management of the enterprise.l2
Hence, as adopted, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law provides that legal
representatives of the enterprise whom government supervisory and auditing
organs find to be responsible for the enterprise's failure are subject to
"administrative" penalties. 129 The imposition of these penalties on manag-
121. Chang, supra note 50, at 366.
122. Id. (citing Proposal Draft, art. 7). The Proposal Draft of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law
required'a failing enterprise to receive a warning prior to the commencement of bankruptcy
proceedings. The requirement of a bankruptcy warning was not included in the final version of
the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law. Id.
123. Id. (citing Opinion Solicitation Draft, art. 55).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 336-67 (citing Opinion Solicitation Draft, art. 58).
126. Id. at 367.
127. Id. The drafters are believed to have been influenced by western bankruptcy law. Id.
128. Id. at 367.
129. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, art. 42 provides:
Article 42. After an enterprise is declared bankrupt, the government
supervisory departments and audit departments are responsible for pinpointing the
responsibility for the bankruptcy of the enterprise.
Where the legal representative of the bankrupt enterprise bears the major
responsibility for the bankruptcy of the enterprise, administrative sanctions shall be
imposed on him.
Where the superior departments in charge of the bankrupt enterprise bear the
major responsibility for the bankruptcy of the enterprise, administrative sanctions shall
be imposed on the leaders of such superior departments in charge. With respect to
the legal representative of the bankrupt enterprise and the leaders of the superior
departments in charge of the bankrupt enterprise who, owing to neglect of duty,
caused the bankruptcy of the enterprise, resulting in a major loss of state property,
14
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ers reflects their responsibility for the enterprise's failure,130 but the nature
of the penalties is unspecified.
31
Additionally, under the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, administrative
penalties apply to officials of the government authority responsible for
supervising the bankrupt enterprise. 32  Because such officials are actively
involved in the management of the enterprise they are held accountable for
the enterprise's failure. 33  Such penalties are intended to provide an
incentive to officials to help the enterprises they supervise avoid bankrupt-
cy. 13
Lastly, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law provides that criminal liability
may be imposed on the debtor's legal representative and the leaders of the
supervising department if the bankruptcy is caused by their neglect of duty
resulting in great loss to state property. 3 Article 187 of the Criminal Law
of the PRC provides for a maximum of five years imprisonment.'3
II. CHAPTER 11 OF THE UNITED STATES' BANKRUPTcY CODE
A. Background
Congress adopted the first national bankruptcy law in 1800. 137
Throughout the nineteenth century, other bankruptcy acts were adopted by
Congress and repealed.13 The fourth Bankruptcy Act, the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, remained in effect until the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in
1978.13
9
Although the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 remained in effect until enactment
of the Bankruptcy Code, it was extensively revised by the Chandler Act of
criminal responsibility shall be investigated in accordance with Article 187 of the
Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China.
translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 87.
130. Xiaohua, supra note 60, at 379.
131. Michael Minor & Karen Stevens-Minor, China's Emerging Bankruptcy Law, 22 INT'L
LAWYER, 1217, 1224 (1987).
132. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, supra note 26, art. 42, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note
26, at 87.
133. Xiaohua, supra note 60, at 380.
134. Id
135. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, art. 42, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 87;
Minor, supra note 131, at 1224.
136. Boshkoff & Song, supra note 26, at 372. Minor, supra note 131, at 1224.
137. Bankrupt Act of April 4, 1800, 2 Stat. 19-36 (1800), repealed by Bankrupt Act of
December 19, 1803, 2 Stat. 248 (1803).
138. Bankrupt Act of August 19, 1841, 5 Stat. 440-49 (1841), repealed by Bankrupt Act of
March 3, 1843, 5 Stat. 614 (1843); Bankrupt Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 517 (1867), repealed by
Bankrupt Act of 1878, 20 Stat. 99 (1878). For a discussion, see Vern Countryman, A History
of American Bankruptcy Law, 81 COM. L.J. 226, 228-32 (1976). See also Stefan A. Reisenfield,
The Evolution of Modern Bankruptcy Law, 31 MINN. L. REv. 401 (1947).
139. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
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1938.14 In the 1930's, Congress established the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"). 4' One of the major initiatives the SEC undertook
was an investigation into abuses, particularly fraud against public bondhold-
ers and stockholders, during court supervised reorganizations. 42 This
investigation culminated in the company reorganization provisions of the
Chandler Act of 1938.143
The Chandler Act reforms provided for greater court involvement in the
reorganization process.1" In addition, SEC intervention was mandatory in
those cases involving large publicly held companies. 45 The Chandler Act
specifically provided for Chapter X corporate reorganizations and Chapter
XI corporate arrangements. 46
Chapter XI was designed for the arrangement of small companies with
few shareholders or bondholders. 47 Under Chapter XI, the existing
management of the debtor continued to run the business and control the
reorganization. Only the rights of unsecured creditors were modified. 'I
Conversely, a complete reorganization could be carried out under
Chapter X.11 Chapter X, designed for the reorganization of large publicly
held companies,"' ° required the appointment of a trustee to operate the
business.'' Furthermore, the SEC was required to scrutinize the qualifica-
tions and disinterestedness of the trustee and to make an independent study
of the fairness of the reorganization plan." 2
The overwhelming majority of corporate managers faced with the
unsavory task of filing for bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,
140. Chandler Act, Bankruptcy Revision of 1938, ch. 575, tit. I, 52 Stat. 840 (1938).
141. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988).
142. Jane Kaufman Winn, Creditors Rights in Taiwan: A Comparison of Corporate
Reorganization Law in the United States and the Republic of China, 13 N.C. J. INT'L L. COM.
REG. 409, 430-31 (1988) (citing the SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE
STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITES, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF
PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, Parts I-VIII (1937)). Examples of cases after
the enactment of the Chandler Act in which the SEC uncovered fraud include In re R. Hoe &
Co. (S.D.N.Y. No. 69-B-461, 1969) reported in 40 SEC. ANN. REP. 126 (1974) (investigative
report by the SEC reveals the presence of insider trading upon which the trustee could sue for
the return of short swing profits to the corporation) and In re Dolly Madison Indus., Inc. (E.D.
PA. 1970) reported in 39 SEC. ANN. REP. 126 (1973) (SEC aided investigation allows private
plaintiffs to bring suit against officers and directors for contravention of federal securities law).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 431.
145. Id. at 431 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (repealed 1978)).
146. Countryman, supra note 138, at 231. 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1976) (repealed 1978);
11 U.S.C. §§ 701-799 (1976) (repealed 1978).
147. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-799 (1976) (repealed 1978).
148. 11 U.S.C. § 756 (1956) (repealed 1978).
149. 11 U.S.C. § 616 (1976) (current version at 11 U.S.C. §1123(b)(1) (1988)).
150. 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-576 (1976) (repealed 1978).
151. 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1976) (current version at II U.S.C. § I104(a) (1988)).
152. 11 U.S.C. § 572 (1976) (repealed 1978).
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retained control by filing for relief under Chapter XI. 53 Thus, many cases
that Congress intended to be filed under Chapter X were filed under Chapter
XI and valuable time was lost litigating over the proper chapter for a
particular reorganization.'54 To avoid such disputes and out of a belief that
third party intervention by a trustee and/or the SEC was more costly than it
was valuable, Congress eliminated all mandatory supervision of reorganiza-
tions by the SEC and produced only one business reorganization chapter in
the Bankruptcy Code, Chapter 11.155
B. Purpose
The provisions of the bankruptcy laws of the United States reflect a
variety of separate and discrete policies.' 56 A primary purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code is to provide a collective forum for sorting out the rights
of the creditors against the assets of a debtor. 5 ' As one commentator has
written:
In bankruptcy, with an inadequate pie to divide and the looming discharge
of unpaid debts, the disputes center on who is entitled to shares of the
debtor's assets and how these shares are to be divided. Distribution among
creditors is not incidental to other concerns; it is the center of the
bankruptcy scheme.'
A primary purpose of Chapter 11 is to rehabilitate a business as a going
concern. Underlying the adoption of Chapter 11 is Congress' belief that it
is more economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate. 59 Hence,
in drafting Chapter 11, Congress sought to direct managers of financially
troubled companies toward reorganization."160
153. DAVID G. EPsTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 3 (1992). See also Michael E. Hooton, The
Role of The Securities and Exchange Commission Under Chapter X, Chapter XI and Proposed
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, 18 B.C. IND. & CoMP. L. REV. 427 (1977) (analyzing pre-
Code SEC involvement). See also Securities and Exchange Commission v. Canandaigua
Enterprises Corp., 339 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that the proceeding be transferred from
Chapter XI to Chapter X where publicly held debt was to be subjected to an arrangement which,
without sacrifice by stockholders, postponed interest on debentures for six years, cancelled other
interests, eliminated all sinking fund obligations, put all interest after a certain date on an income
basis and made it noncumulative, and defined income so that principal payments to existing trade
and other unsecured creditors would be an expense of future years.)
154. EpsTEN ET AL., supra note 153, at 3.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Radin, supra note 24, at 3-4.
158. Warren, Policy, supra note 23, at 785.
159. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 7, at 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6179. See
also 124 CONG. REC. H32, 392 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978); Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach
to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 775, 776 (1988).
160. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 7, at 220, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6179.
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C. Scope and Threshold Requirements
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, a corporate debtor seeking to
voluntarily reorganize was required to be insolvent or unable to pay its debts
as they matured.' 6' Creditors seeking to force a debtor into bankruptcy
were required to prove that the debtor had committed one of six acts of
bankruptcy within four months of the time of the filing of the petition."6
These acts included disposing of assets or attempting to flee a jurisdic-
tion. "'63 In addition, all petitioners for reorganization under Chapter X
were required to establish their good faith."6
Conversely, the Bankruptcy Code does not require a debtor seeking to
voluntarily reorganize to be insolvent nor does it condition a debtor's use of
bankruptcy on owing any minimum amount of debt. Rather, the Bankruptcy
Code provides that a bankruptcy petition may be filed by any entity that may
be a debtor, as that term is defined in the Bankruptcy Code."° The Bank-
ruptcy Code requires only that the "debtor" be a person with a residence,
domicile, place of business or property in the United States."
161. See II U.S.C. § 550 (1976) (repealed 1978); 11 U.S.C. § 723 (1976) (repealed 1978);
11 U.S.C. § 823 (1976) (repealed 1978).
162. 11 U.S.C. § 526 (1976) (repealed 1978).
163. Id.
164. 11 U.S.C. § 141 (1976) (repealed 1978). See, e.g., In re Lela & Co., 551 F.2d 399, 408
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (to find good faith, court looks to the facts to determine whether the financial,
economic and legal situation of the debtor is one within the contemplation of Chapter X); In re
Diversey Hotel Corp., 165 F.2d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 1948) (sincere debtor could have petition
dismissed for bad faith if facts as presented demonstrated petition was not filed for reasons
consistent with the intended purposes of the Bankruptcy Code); In re The Bible Speaks, 65 B.R.
415, 420-22 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (discussing pre-Code good faith filing decisions).
165. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
166. 11 U.S.C. § 109 provides:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, only a person that resides
or has a domicile, a place of business, or property in the United States, or a municipality,
may be a debtor under this title.
(b) A person may be a debtor under chapter 7 of this title only if such person is
not-
(1) a railroad;
(2) a domestic insurance company, bank, savings bank, cooperative bank, savings
and loan association, building and loan association, homestead association, credit
union, or industrial bank or similar institution which is an insured bank as defined
in section 3(h) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(h)); or
(3) a foreign insurance company, bank, savings bank, cooperative bank, savings
and loan association, building and loan association, homestead association, or credit
union, engaged in such business in the United States.
id), Only a person that may be a debtor under chapter 7 of this title, except a
stockbroker or a commodity broker, and a railroad may be a debtor under chapter
I I of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 109 (1988).
The definition of person includes corporations, except insurers and financial institutions.
11 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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Similarly, the Bankruptcy Code does not require proof of any acts of
bankruptcy to commence an involuntary proceeding. Under the Bankruptcy
Code, the first basis for involuntary relief is that the debtor is generally not
paying debts as they come due. 67 This is not an insolvency test. The
focus is on whether the debtor is actually paying its debts rather than on the
debtor's ability to pay as shown on the balance sheet. The alternative basis
for involuntary relief is that within 120 days before the petition was filed, a
receiver, assignee or custodian took possession of substantially all of the
debtor's property."6 An involuntary proceeding can be commenced against
any debtor who is eligible for voluntary bankruptcy, with the exception of
corporations that are not monied, business or commercial. 69
Lastly, the Bankruptcy Code does not require that a petition for
reorganization be filed in good faith. 70 Good faith is only a confirmation
167. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1988). The notes of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Report
No. 95-989, explain that the test that the debtor is generally not paying his debts as they become
due is a variation of the equity insolvency test which has been in equity jurisprudence for
hundreds of years. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1978) reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5901. Although the Bankruptcy Code does not provide specific standards
as to the number or the size of the claims that the debtor is not paying, case law provides some
guidance. See, e.g., In re West Side Community Hosjp., Inc., 112 B.R. 243 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
90) (describing a two step inquiry utilized by courts in applying the generally not paying test).
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. The Bankruptcy Code does not contain an express good faith filing requirement.
Carolin Corp. v. Miller, 886 F.2d 693, 698 (4th Cir. 1989) (The "good faith filing" requirement
applicable to Chapter 11 cases is not to be found in the Bankruptcy Code itself.); In re Albany
Partners Ltd., 749 F.2d 670 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (Chapter 11 does not expressly condition the right
to file or maintain a proceeding on the "good faith" of the debtor at the time the petition is
initiated.) Some courts have held that, as a good faith determination at the inception of the case
is not mandated by statute, it should not "even be considered except under the most egregious
circumstances." In re Garsal Realty, Inc. 98 B.R. 140, 152 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989).
However, other courts have invoked an implied good faith requirement in dismissing
reorganization cases. See, e.g., In re Clause Enterprises of Ft. Meyers, Ltd., 150 B.R. 476
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993); In re American Property Corp., 44 B.R. 180 (Bankr. MD. Fla. 1984);
In re Nancant, Inc., 8 B.R. 1005 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981). Filings dismissed for lack of good
faith generally fall into one of several categories: (1) cases filed to obtain the benefits of the
automatic stay when an injunction or stay pending appeal is unavailable in litigation, see, e.g.,
In re Walter, 108 B.R. 244 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989); In re Port Richey Service Co., 44 B.R. 634
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984); (2) single asset cases filed to prevent foreclosure by a secured creditor,
see, e.g., In re Tampa Medical Tower Ltd. Partnership, 145 B.R. 99 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992);
Carolin Corp., 886 F.2d 693; and (3) cases where property is transferred to a newly formed or
revitalized entity on the eve of filing for bankruptcy, see, e.g., In re Albany Partners, Ltd., 749
F.2d 670; In re Franklin Mort. & Inv. Co., 143 B.R. 295 (Bankr. D. D.C. 1992); Michael J.
Venditto, The Implied Requirement of "Good Faith" Filing: Where Are the Limits of Bad Faith,
4 DET. C.L. REv. 1591, 1592 (1993).
Conversely, courts have generally rejected challenges to good faith in "strategic" filings.
For instance, Johns-Manville and Continental Airlines both involved good faith challenges. In
In re Continental Airlines, three of the carrier's labor unions moved to dismiss the case alleging
that it had been filed in bad faith solely for the purpose of rejecting collective bargaining
agreements. The court, although acknowledging that rejection of the collective bargaining
agreements was a planned element of the reorganization, denied the motion, relying on the
debtor's financial position and the need to reorganize. In re Continental Airlines, Corp., 38 B.R.
67.
Similarly, after Johns-Manville filed its Chapter 11 petition, motions to dismiss were filed
19
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requirement of Chapter 11.1 Congress eliminated the statutory require-
ment that petitions for reorganization be filed in good faith. It also neglected
to include good faith as a cause for dismissal or conversion of a Chapter 11
proceeding. 172
Thus, the Bankruptcy Code, unlike the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,173
imposes no explicit financial or good faith requirements on debtors
seeking 74 to use Chapter 11. Debtors, at most, face only indirect obsta-
cles. Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Code reduces the stigma of bankruptcy
by allowing solvent companies to file for Chapter 11.175 As a result,
bankruptcy courts resolve financial disputes and collect debts rather than
judge debtors and their management. 76
D. Reorganization and Exclusivity
The Bankruptcy Code gives the debtor an exclusive right to file a
Chapter 11 reorganization plan within 120 days after the filing of the
petition."7 The debtor then has 180 days from the petition date to have its
by a committee representing asbestos claimants. The motions asserted that the filing had been
improperly motivated by the desire to use the estimation and discharge provisions available in
Chapter 11. The court denied the motions, relying on the historic economic viability of the
debtor, the financial pressures created by the size of the projected tort liabilities and the benefit
to creditors which would result from reorganization. It concluded that using a reorganization to
liquidate and manage these liabilities was not an abuse of the court's powers. Johns-Manville
Corp., 36 B.R. 737. With respect to an implied good faith filing requirement, the court stated
"it follows logically that in the case of a filing by a viable and legitimate company with real
creditors not formed as a sham solely for the purpose of filing, the burden to establishing the
company's good faith should be tested where Congress placed it: for emergence out of Chapter
11 pursuant to Section 1129." Id. (relying on Banque de Financement v. First Nat'7 Bank of
Boston, 568 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1977)).
171. Good faith is required as a condition to the confirmation of a plan. 11 U.S.C. §
1129(a)(3) (1988). Under this section, "good faith exists 'when there is a reasonable likelihood
that the plan will achieve a result consistent with the objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy
Code."' In re Cherry, 84 B.R. 134, 137 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (quoting In re Nite Lite Inns,
17 B.R. 367, 370 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982)) or when the plan was proposed with "honesty and
good intentions" and with "a basis for expecting that a reorganization can be effected"; In re
Koelbl, 751 F.2d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting Manati Sugar Co. v. Mock, 75 F.2d 284, 285
(2d Cir. 1935). The focus is upon the plan; the inquiry is therefore different than the threshold
determination of a good faith filing. In re Madison Hotel Associates, 749 F.2d 410, 425-26 (7th
Cir. 1984); Venditto, supra note 170, at 1593. See also Lawrence M. Ponoroff & F. Stephen
Knippenberg, Legal Theory: The Implied Good Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an
Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 919 (1991).
172. 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (1988). Indeed, all of the examples of cause for dismissal set forth
in the Code are based on the debtor's post-petition activities. Id.
173. 30 Stat. 544 (1898). *
174. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, supra note 4.
175. DELANEY, supra note 8, at 13-17. For similar observations see ELIZABETH WARREN
& JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 416-17 (2d. ed. 1991) (criticizing
the "act of bankruptcy" requirement because it disregards financial condition and results in
delays).
176. DELANEY, supra note 8, at 13-17.
177. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1988).
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plan accepted.' This time period, known as the exclusivity period, may
be increased upon request by any party in interest upon a showing of
cause. 179
In promulgating the exclusivity period, Congress sought a compromise
between Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.180 Filing
under former Chapter X required the appointment of an independent trustee
to run the business and allowed any party to propose a reorganization
plan. ' Filing under former Chapter XI allowed the debtor to retain
control of business operations and the exclusive right to file a reorganization
plan."u The issue in exclusivity is how long the managers of the deb-
tor are allowed to hold total control over an agenda that affects the financial
interests of other parties. The debtor's control has a significant impact
on bargaining. A debtor with an extended exclusive right to file a plan may
delay filing until creditors, faced with the increasing costs of continued
delays, acquiesce to an unfavorable plan. "
Congress recognized that unlimited delay in the filing of a Chapter 11
plan makes creditors hostages of the debtor. It, therefore, drafted the
exclusivity period to strike a balance between the debtor's interest and those
of other parties." Two policies which coexist throughout Chapter 11 are
captured in the exclusivity clause: encouraging debtor's management to
utilize Chapter 11 while still promoting the probability of reorganization. "
By limiting the period to 120 days, Congress hoped to put a certain
amount of pressure on the reorganization process. ' 7  However, the
establishment of the 120-day exclusivity period has been accepted by judges
as a determination by Congress that Chapter 11 debtors should be granted a
longer reorganization period. 88 Most Chapter 11 debtors are routinely
178. Id
179. Id
180. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 7, at 231-32, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6191.
See also In re Sharon Steel Corp., 78 B.R. 762, 769 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987).
181. Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 32, at 67.
182. Id
183. Id at 72.
184. Hugh M. Ray & Lawrence B. Schreve, Requests for Extensions of the Debtor's
Exclusivity Period for Filing a Plan: Section 1121 Since In re Timbers of Inwood Forest
Associates, 29 S. TEX. L. REv. 563, 563-76 (1988). See, e.g., In re Lake in the Woods, 10 B.R.
338, 345-56 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (extension not allowed where primary reason for request was to
pressure creditors to accept plan).
185. Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 32, at 67.
186. Martin J. Bienenstock, Conflicts Between Management and the Debtor in Possession's
Fiduciary Duties, 61 U. CiN. L. REv. 543, 561 (1992).
187. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 7, at 231-32, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6191.
188. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble With Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 729, 747-48
(1993) [hereinafter LoPucki, Trouble].
1994]
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granted extensions of the exclusivity period. 9 Moreover, debtors who fail
to meet the deadline or to obtain an extension usually suffer no con-
sequences. '*
Where managers have total control over a corporation they are likely to
be risk takers with its assets. 191  Shareholders or creditors believing
corporate management has acted improperly and engaged in unnecessary
risks with corporate assets have as their primary remedy under the Bankrupt-
cy Code the right to seek appointment of a trustee."
E. Corporate Governance: Protection of Management
1. Appointment of a Trustee
Under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, trustees were
189. For cases where extensions of exclusivity were granted, see e.g., In re Public Service
Co., 88 B.R. 521 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988); In re Texaco Inc., 76 B.R. 322 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987);
In re Perkins, 71 B.R. 294 (W.D. Tenn. 1987); In re Pine Run Trust, Inc., 67 B.R. 432 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1986); In re UNR Indus., Inc., 72 B.R. 789 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1987); In re McLean
Industries, Inc., 87 B.R. 830 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Manville Forest Products Corp., 31
B.R. 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re United Press International, Inc., 60 B.R 265 (Bankr. D.C.
1986).
In a study by LoPucki and Whiford, in thirty-four out of forty-three cases exclusivity was
continued throughout the case. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and
Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991
WIS. L. REv. 11, 31 n.67 [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Venue Choice]. LoPucki and
Whitford explain:
The debtors in many of these cases were suffering from delay, but the key to
understanding the bargaining leverages was to realize that their creditors were
suffering much more. For many debtors, the difference was great enough that they
could trade movement of the case for substantive concessions from other parties.
Lopucki, Trouble, supra note 188, at 753-54.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994), provides that
a bankruptcy court order extending or shortening the period in which the debtor has the exclusive
right to file a plan may be appealed as of right to the district court. The right to an appeal from
a bankruptcy court order extending the debtor's exclusive right to file a plan is intended to assist
creditors in avoiding unduly long extensions of exclusivity. See discussion infra Part III(D).
190. The failure to meet the deadline or obtain an extension violates no rule. Legally, the
only consequence of expirations of exclusivity is that other parties in interest may file a plan.
In a study by LoPucki and Whitford, out of nine cases where the exclusivity period was allowed
to expire, most resulted in the confirmation of plans jointly proposed by the debtor and the
unsecured creditors' committee. Only in one case were creditors able to capitalize on the
expiration of exclusivity and, even in that case, months elapsed before they decided to do so.
LoPucki & Whitford, Venue Choice, supra note 188, at 36 n.85; LoPucki, Trouble, supra note
187, at 747-48.
191. Bienenstock, supra note 185, at 544-45.
192. Bienenstock, supra note 185, at 550. Shareholder derivative and similar suits are not
effective control devices because they become property of the estate once a bankruptcy case is
filed. Mitchell Excavators, Inc. v. Mitchell, 734 F.2d 129 (2d Cir 1984). A creditors committee
or another party in interest may request leave to prosecute such actions, but requests are not
always granted. Id. at 549, n.29; 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988).
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mandatory in any case involving at least $250,000 of noncontingent debt.193
"IT]he Senate's version of the Bankruptcy Code [also] required a trustee in
any case involving at least $5 million of non-trade debt and 1000 security
holders."" Ultimately, however, Congress refused to require the appoint-
ment of trustees based on a debt and security holders formula due to concern
that such automatic appointment would discourage managers from seeking
Chapter 11 protection'9 "By limiting the circumstances requiring a
trustee, Congress increased the probability that management would resort to
Chapter 11 while the debtor still had sufficient assets and vitality to
maximize its chances for a successful reorganization as a going con-
cern." 
196
As enacted, the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a court to enter an order
appointing a trustee at any time after commencement of the case and before
confirmation of the plan."9 However, Chapter 11 presumes that existing
management will continue to operate the debtor. 9 Therefore, appointment
of a trustee is extraordinary and the requesting party must establish the
grounds for appointment by clear and convincing evidence.'"
Two separate bases exist for appointment of a trustee. The first is "for
cause," including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence or gross mismanagement
of the affairs of the debtor by current management, either before or after the
commencement of the case.2°°
Courts have not clearly defined the "cause" sufficient to warrant
appointment of a trustee.201 Misconduct of the debtor which diminishes the
193. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 167; See 11 U.S.C. § 556 (1976) (amended by 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1101(1), 1104(1) (1988)).
194. Bienenstock, supra note 185, at 549.
195. "[A] standard that led to too frequent appointment would prevent debtors from seeking
relief under the reorganization chapter, and would leave the chapter largely unused except in
extreme cases. One of the problems that the Bankruptcy Commission recognized in current
bankruptcy and reorganization practice is that debtors too often wait too long to seek bankruptcy
relief." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 7, at 233-34, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6193
quoted in Bienenstock, supra note 185, at 549-50, n.29.
196. Bienenstock, supra note 185, at 550.
197. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988).
198. Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 32, at 55.
199. See, e.g., In re Microwave Products of America, 102 B.R. 666 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1989) (trustee appointed where failure of debtor to investigate avoidable transfers or to collect
receivables from parent company resulted in erosion of confidence in debtor); In re Stein & Day,
Inc., 87 B.R. 290 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (appointment of trustee not justified where creditor
had not shown fraud, dishonesty or gross mismanagement, although debtor corporation had
breached agreement with secured creditor by failing to establish escrow account); In re William
A. Smith Constr. Co., 77 B.R. 124 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (appointment of trustee justified
where debtor lacked adequate managerial control and had depleted corporate assets, pre and post
petition, resulting in impairment of secured creditor's interest). See also Nimmer & Feinberg,
supra note 32, at 55.
200. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1988).
201. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 154, at 17-8. See generally Robert J. Berdan & Bruce G.
Arnold, Displacing the Debtor in Possession: The Requisites For and Advantages of the
Appointment of a Trustee in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 457 (1984) (discussing
1994]
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sale of secured claims or depletes assets of the estate, combined with records
that fail adequately to reflect such transactions, may be enough. 202 Howev-
er, creditors' allegations of mismanagement of the debtor's business alone
will not normally warrant appointment of a trustee.' °3 Appointment of a
trustee based on mere mismanagement is seen as defeating the Chapter 11
philosophy of giving the debtor a second chance.'
A second standard allows the court to appoint a trustee if it is in the
interest of creditors, equity security holders and the estate.' Again the
presumption is with retaining current management, the Bankruptcy Code does
not contemplate that a trustee will be appointed because a court believes
someone else will operate the business more effectively or even because the
managers are tactically disadvantaging creditors.' Thus, while theoreti-
cally this is an alternate standard for appointment, practically courts rarely
order the appointment of a trustee absent indicia of fraud, dishonesty or gross
mismanagement. 21
Not surprisingly, however, managers more interested in their own future
than that of creditors or shareholders will not leave a paper trail of fraud or
gross mismanagement. Rather, such managers will operate by the book yet
make key decisions based on considerations of their own welfare.2 "s In this
case, the debtor's president or CEO remains in control of the company with
broad discretion to operate the business. The court will not scrutinize or
grounds for appointment of a trustee).
202. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 154, at 17-8. See, e.g., In re Main Line Motors, Inc., 9
B.R. 782 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (transfer to related corporation without supporting documents,
security or obligation to pay interest requires appointment of trustee); In re Anchorage Boat
Sales, Inc., 4 B.R. 635 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) (sales out of trust, combined with misapplication
of proceeds and confusion in accounting system, requires appointment of trustee).
203. EPsTEIN ET AL., supra note 154, at 17-8. See e.g., In re Crescent Beach Inn, Inc., 22
B.R. 155 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982) (principal's conduct falling short of gross mismanagement does
not require appointment of trustee).
204. EPsTEIN ET AL., supra note 154, at 17-8. As one commentator has noted, the mere fact
of filing for relief in bankruptcy does not necessarily demonstrate that the managers are incapable
or unsuited. "Indeed, slight evidence of mismanagement in the form of imprudent or poor
business decisions or use of resources are to be expected .... Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note
32, at 56 (citing In re La Sherene, Inc., 3 B.R. 169, 174 (Bankr. N.D. La. 1980)).
205. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (1988).
206. Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 32, at 60.
207. Id. at 55; EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 154, at 17-8. See, e.g., In re Hotel Associates,
Inc., 3 B.R. 343, 345 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that a determination must be made that
a trustee will accomplish the goals of a Chapter 11 plan more efficiently and effectively than the
management of the debtor with whom the members of the business community have had and will
continue to have business transactions). Compare, In re Gaslight Club, 782 F.2d 767 (7th Cir.
1986); In re Lifeguard Industries,, Inc., 37 B.R. 3, 17 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (court denied
order confirming appointment of newly elected directors on ground that proposed management
lacked experience and ability): In re United Press International, Inc., 60 B.R. 265 (Bankr. D.C.
1986) (bankruptcy court upheld a consent order abolishing the debtor's board of directors,
appointing a new chief executive officer and authorizing the new CEO to file a plan).
208. Bienenstock, supra note 186, at 552; Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford,
Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large Publicly-Held
Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 151 (1990) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining].
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entertain objections to ordinary course transactions, nor will the court
substitute its judgment of business risk for that of the debtor. 3 9 Hence,
Congress' "attempt to entice management to use [Chapter 11] also serves to
entrench management and shield it from breaches of its own fiduciary
duties. "210
209. While in control of the Chapter II debtor, the CEO or president acting as the Debtor
in Possession ("DIP") does have statutory duties involving ministerial and reporting functions.
These duties include the obligations to file reports, hire personnel and conduct the reporting and
accounting activities generally associated with operating a business. 11 U.S.C. § 1106 (1988).
However, other statutory sources provide the DIP with the right to operate the business and
exercise business discretion. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107-08. Finally, still other statutory sources
expressly empower the DIP to make decisions that benefit some claimants but harm others.
These include the power to propose reorganization plans differentiating among classes of
creditors, 11 U.S.C. § 1121(a), to reject or assume executory contracts, 11 U.S.C. § 365, to
object to claims, 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a), and to decide whether to seek avoidance of some
preexisting transfers and obligations, 11 U.S.C. §§ 344-554. These powers establish "a simple
proposition: the DIP is a separate, independent force with the opportunity to influence and
control how losses are distributed." Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 32, at 27.
The power of the DIP is further accentuated by the fact that the court will not scrutinize
ordinary course of business transactions, 11 U.S.C. § 363, nor will it substitute its judgment of
business risk for that of the debtor. See, e.g., Committee of Asbestos-Related Litigants v. Johns-
Manville, Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 60 B.R. 612 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (multinational
corporate debtor's hiring of lobbyist is a transaction in the ordinary course of business, where
corporation hired lobbyists before filing petition and such employment is common in industry
practice); In re Simasko Production Company, 47 B.R. 444 (D. Colo. 1985) (court would not
entertain objections to debtor's financing order on the basis that financing would be used to fund
a business program which posed a serious economic risk).
210. Bienenstock, supra note 185, at 550. In addition to the appointment of a trustee, other
theoretical "controls" on management include the creditors' committee and the United States
Trustee. However, these controls are often ineffective.
The Bankruptcy Code requires the appointment of a committee of creditors holding
unsecured claims as soon as practicable after filing of the petition. Additional committees of
creditors or equity security holders may also be appointed. 11 U.S.C. § 1102. Official
committees consult with the debtor, investigate the debtor's business and financial condition,
participate in formulating a plan of reorganization, make recommendations regarding the plan and
may request appointments of trustees and perform other services. 11 U.S.C. § 1103.
"In theory, committees should have significant influence over the outcome of the
reorganization proceeding, thus curbing debtor indiscretions. In practice, however, they rarely
exert such influence." Edward S. Adams, Governance in Chapter 11 Reorganizations: Reducing
Costs, Improving Results, 73 B.U. L. REv. 581, 614-15 (1993). Even where committees are
appointed and active, several elements contribute to their ineffectiveness. First, the lack of
compensation beyond expenses creates a disincentive for spending considerable time on
committee matters. Second, the committee members often do not have the requisite expertise.
Lastly, their effectiveness is constrained by their inability to directly control the debtor. "They
can only influence debtor in possession actions, not compel them." Id at 614-15; John T.
Roache, The Fiduciary Obligations of a Debtor in Possession, U. ILL. L. REv. 133, 161 (1993)
(citing In re B & W. Tractor Co., 38 B.R. 613 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984) for the finding that
creditors' committees in general are inactive and ineffective).
The office of United States Trustee was established to aid in the administration of
bankruptcy cases. 28 U.S.C. §§ 581-89 (1988). The United States Trustee is charged with
monitoring the progress of cases under Title 11 and taking such actions as it deems to be
appropriate to prevent undue delay. 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(G). The United States Trustee has
complete discretion in determining whether and how to advance goals of case management. It
is the current policy of the United States Trustee program to encourage creditor involvement and
to act directly in a Chapter 11 case only when such involvement is minimal. Hon. Steven W.
Rhodes, Eight Statutory Causes of Delay and Expense in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Cases, 67 AM.
BANKR. L. J. 287, 309 (1993). Some commentators charge that the United States Trustee
program has failed to carry out congressional intent in supervising Chapter II cases. See, e.g.,
25
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2. Fiduciary Duties
Managers of corporations in Chapter 11, whether solvent or insolvent,
do owe fiduciary obligations to both creditors and shareholders. 2 ' Howev-
er,
to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins the analysis. It gives direction
to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he
owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these
obligations? And what are the consequences of his deviation from
duty?
212
Managers of a debtor under the protection of Chapter 11 assume the
fiduciary responsibility of protecting the financial interests of shareholders
and creditors.2 3 Such interests are often conflicting, not only with each
other, 14 but also with the interests of the managers themselves.215 Man-
agers are concerned with preserving or improving their position with the
corporation. They will be adverse to liquidating substantial assets, during the
Chapter 11 case or as part of the reorganization plan, if the liquidation will
materially decrease the business to be managed. 216  Similarly, managers
will prefer creditors willing to hire them to operate the business of the
reorganized debtor, irrespective of whether those creditors are acting in the
best interest of the estate. 217  "In both situations, management has a
fiduciary duty to do what is best for the estate and creditors, and has a
potentially conflicting interest in doing what is best for management. "218
Moreover, where debtors are insolvent, shareholders have little incentive
to be vigilant.2 9 "Directors who are major shareholders may acknowledge
Richard B. Levin & Kenneth Klee, The Original Intent of the United States Trustee System,
NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISOR, Jan. 1993, at 2, 4; Francis F. Sczebak, The GAO Got It Wrong,
NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISOR, Jan. 1993, at 7. Others note that the system has "not had much
impact" in preventing undue delay. See, e.g., LoPucki, Trouble, supra note 187, at 750 n.86.
Still others blame the program's deficiencies on inadequate funding. Richard L. Levine, The
United States Trustee Program Today, NORTON BANKIL L. ADVISOR, Jan. 1993, at 5; John E.
Logan, The General Accounting Office Review of the United States Trustee Program and
Bankruptcy Administrator Program, NORTON BANKIL L. ADVISOR, Jan. 1993, at 4.
211. Commodity Future Trading Commn. v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985) (citing
Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 651 (1963)). Directors and managers of solvent corporations
outside of bankruptcy owe no fiduciary obligations to creditors. Their duties are to the owners.
If the business becomes insolvent, however, some case law supports the proposition that
corporate manager's obligations expand to include creditors. Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note
32, at 31.
212. SEC v. Chevery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-6 (1943).
213. Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 32, at 32.
214. Id
215. Id
216. Bienenstock, supra note 185, at 545-46.
217. Id at 545-46. See also LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining, supra note 206, at 150-51.
218. Bienenstock, supra note 185, at 546.
219. Id at 545.
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the loss of their pecuniary interests and may resign."' Independent
directors may also resign, particularly if liability insurance becomes
unavailable. 22' The consequence of this is a board of directors consisting
solely of management. Absent court intervention, the managers report to
themselves and the potential for abuse is increased.'m
3. Protection of Management
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 limited abuse through the threshold
requirements of insolvency and good faith and the mandatory appointment of
trustees for large, publicly held corporations. m The Bankruptcy Code
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. A number of federal laws restrict the actions of managers. See, e.g. 26 U.S.C. §§
1-9601 (1988) (Internal Revenue Code); 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77b (1988) (Securities Act of 1933).
However, there is no federal law formulating the fiduciary duties of an insolvent company's
officers and directors. Rather, corporate law is a matter of state law. Bienenstock, supra note
185, at 551.
Traditionally, corporate laws treat officers and directors as the agents of the shareholders.
Recently some states have revised their corporate law to allow a director, when determining the
best interests of the corporation, to consider constituencies other than shareholders including the
interests of employees, suppliers, creditors, customers, the state and national economies and the
community and society at large. Bienenstock, supra note 185, at 554 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 10-1202 (Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. AN. § 33-313 (West 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 607.0830 (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5) (1989); HAW. REV. STAT. §
415-35(b) (1988 & Supp. 1990); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1702 (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 32 8.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d) (West 1989 & Supp.
1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.101B (West Supp. 1990); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 271B § 12-
210(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1989 & Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12.92(G) (West
Supp. 1991); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 716 (Supp. 1990); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B,
§ 65 (Law, Co-op. Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West Supp. 1991); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(d) (Supp. 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.347.1(4) (Vernon Supp. 1991);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2035(1)(c) (Supp. 1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14-A-6-1(2) (West Supp.
1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (Supp. 1989); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson Supp. 1990); OR. REV.
STAT. § 60.357(5) (Supp. 1990); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 511, 1721(c) (Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 7-5-2-8(a) (Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-33-4 (Supp. 1990); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-35-204 (1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.305 (West Supp. 1990); WYo. STAT.
§ 17-16-830 (1989)).
However, even in these states the courts utilize a business judgment test in enforcing
fiduciary standards. This test requires that unless a plaintiff shows "fraud, bad faith, gross
overreaching or abuse of discretion, courts will not interfere with the exercise of businessjudgment by corporate directors." Nimmer, supra note 32, at 35 (citing Treadway Co. v. Care
Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980)).
Of course, the filing of the bankruptcy suspends the enforcement of most laws outside of
bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). However, most bankruptcy courts follow the business
judgment test in reviewing compliance of the debtor with its fiduciary duties. Nimmer &
Feinberg, supra note 32, at 36. This is true even though the fiduciary role of the DIP's
management differs from that of fiduciaries in non-bankruptcy settings and even though states
have insufficient reason or opportunity to focus on corporate governance issues as they relate to
insolvent corporations because insolvent corporations usually wind up in bankruptcy where they
are subject to federal bankruptcy laws. Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 32, at 36; David A.
Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 471, 490 (1994) (arguing that the states should regulate corporate bankruptcy).
223. See discussion supra Part II(C).
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requires neither insolvency nor good faith.' Moreover, creditors may
normally obtain a Chapter 11 trustee only upon a showing of fraud,
dishonesty or gross mismanagement3m
Just as the Bankruptcy Code provides few consequences for
management's deviation from duty, there is "no statutory federal law
formulating the fiduciary duties of an insolvent company's management and
directors. "I Rather, state laws and jurisprudence remain in effect, except
to the extent preempted by federal law.7
Common law sanctions are also limited. Case law establishes that
although difficult to prove, willful and deliberate violations of fiduciary
duties will result in personal liability.' Case law also provides that
negligence by a fiduciary results in liability of the estate. 9 However, this
is little solace to a creditor already facing inadequate estate assets for
recovery of his claim."0
III. THE CRISIS OF CHAPTER 11 REFORM
A. Background
Reform of Chapter 11 has been a topic of debate among academics since
the 1980's. Thomas Jackson and Douglas Baird first analyzed Chapter 1 l's
alteration of the individual contracts entered into by a debtor and its
creditors." Their creditors' bargain model posits that, if creditors were
able to bargain among themselves, they would agree to refrain from
enforcing their individual collection rights in order to preserve the debtor as
a going concern.12  However, because creditors are too widely dispersed
to bargain effectively among themselves, bankruptcy is necessary to
224. See discussion supra Part II(C).
225. See discussion supra Part II(E)(I).
226. Bienenstock, supra note 186, at 551.
227. Id See discussion supra Part II(E)(2), n.222.
228. See Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Weaver, 680 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1982) (individual debtor
partner may be personally liable for willful violations of fiduciary duties); United States ex rel.
George Schumann Tire & Battery Co. v. Grant, 145 B.R. 104 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) (Chapter
7 trustee could be held personally liable for breaching fiduciary duty by failing to turn over
funds).
229. Ford Motor Credit Co., 680 F.2d at 462.
230. Criminal sanctions are generally applied only in instances of intentional fraud. 18
U.S.C. §§ 151-155 (1988) formerly provided criminal sanctions for bankruptcy crimes.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994), revises sections
152, 153 and 154 in order to address a multiplicity of fraud schemes.
231. Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors'
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982) [hereinafter Jackson, Creditors Bargain]; Douglas G. Baird
& Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership
Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI.
L. REv. 97 (1984) [hereinafter Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations]. For an analysis
of proposed Chapter 11 reforms see generally Skeel, Brave New World, supra note 21.
232. Jackson, Creditors Bargain, supra note 231, at 862.
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implement the creditors' bargain.3 3 Nevertheless, Jackson and Baird assert
that bankruptcy should not alter a creditor's state law entitlements.'" To
encourage creditors to participate in the reorganization process, the
substantive rules in bankruptcy should reflect state law.
Initial criticism of the creditors' bargain model focused on the reality that
bankruptcy does not preserve creditors' state law entitlements. 36 Rather,
bankruptcy favors lower priority creditors and the debtor at the expense of
creditors entitled to a higher priority under state law. 7
Other commentators argue that bankruptcy's alteration of the creditors'
state law priorities undermines the validity of the creditors' bargain mod-
el." In their view, bankruptcy should implement social concerns beyond
the creditors' bargain with the debtor. 9
A third group of commentators question Baird's and Jackson's assump-
tion that bankruptcy is necessary to solve the creditors' "common pool"
problem.4 ° One commentator argues that the creditors' bargain model
focuses only on creditors, ignoring the role of debtors. 4" Another commen-
tator argues that creditors could prevent the dismemberment of a viable
debtor through the use of secured credit arrangements, without the necessity
of bankruptcy.u 2
As early as 1986, there were suggestions that Chapter 11 could be
eliminated without adverse results. 43  This precipitated a heated debate
among academics, but did not create a stir in the popular media.' Howev-
er, in 1992, Michael Bradley and Michael Rosenzweig drew national
attention by concluding that Chapter 11 should be abolished 4 5
233. Id.
234. Id. at 867-70.
235. Id
236. Skeel, Brave New World, supra note 21, at 471.
237. Skeel, Corporate Voting, supra note 21, at 484.
238. Skeel, Brave New World, supra note 21, at 471.
239. Warren, Policy, supra note 23; Donald R. Korobkin, Value and Rationality in
Bankruptcy Decision Making, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 333 (1992).
240. Skeel, Brave New World, supra note 21, at 471.
241. James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law: Bankruptcy
Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2097, 2111-13 (1990).
242. Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior and Common Pools, 59 U. Cm. L.
REV. 645 (1992).
243. Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD.
127 (1986).
244. Warren, Policy, supra note 23. See also Baird, Loss Distribution, supra note 23.
245. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 9. Bradley and Rosenzweig compared the
prebankruptcy and post-bankruptcy stock and bond values of publicly held firms that filed under
the Bankruptcy Act to those that filed under the Bankruptcy Code. They concluded that firms
filing Chapter 11 petitions were worth significantly more on the filing date but lost a much
higher percentage of their value while in bankruptcy. However, Bradley and Rosenzweig's
conclusions have been severely criticized. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case for
Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437, 438 (1992) [hereinafter Warren, Untenable Case];
Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Reply to Professors Bradley &
1994]
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B. The Crisis
The intensity of the controversy over the future of Chapter 11 arises
from the increasing perception that Chapter 11 is not merely unnecessary but
actually harmful for many corporations.' Two central concerns fuel this
view.
The first is the cost of Chapter 11. 4  Attorney and accountant fees
can be significant. Further, Chapter 11 creates disruption and lost opportuni-
ty costs.24
Second, Chapter 11 creates negative effects even before a corporation
files for bankruptcy.249 Commentators have long recognized Chapter 11's
affect on management incentives.' They reason that, because Chapter 11
limits the downside of any business disaster, it encourages managers to issue
excessive debt and take excessive risks."' Bradley and Rosenzweig
attribute even greater harm to management incentives. They argue that
Chapter 11 affirmatively diverts assets away from equity security holders and
creditors .252
C. Academic Proposals
Commentators who conclude that Chapter 11 has failed encourage the
adoption of one or more of four general alternatives: auctions; implementa-
tion of a predetermined bankruptcy capital structure; contingent or chameleon
equity; and/or the elimination of Chapter 11.2s
The auction was first suggested by Baird.' Under this proposal, a
court or a trustee would sell the debtor corporation to the highest bidder. 5
Rosenzweig, 91 MIcH. L. REv. 79 (1992).
246. Skeel, Brave New World, supra note 21, at 472.
247. Id.; LoPucki, Trouble, supra note 188, at 730-31 n.6.
248. Skeel, Brave New World, supra note 21, at 472; LoPucki, Trouble, supra note 188, at
730-31 n.6.
249. Skeel, Brave New World, supra note 21, at 473.
250. Id.
251. Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 439, 473-74
(1992) [hereinafter Adler, Risk Allocation].
252. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 9, at 1047, 1052, 1057.
253. For an in depth analysis of each of the four proposed Chapter 11 alternatives see Skeel,
Brave New World, supra note 21, at 472-76. See also LoPucki & Whitford, Corporate
Governance, supra note 31, at 753-67.
254. Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations, supra note 231, at 139-41; Douglas G.
Baird, Revisiting Auctions, supra note 31. See also Adler, Risk Allocation, supra note 251, at
488; Bebchuck, supra note 159, at 785-88.
255. Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations, supra note 231, at 139-41. A mandatory
auction, which is required at the commencement of the case, is significantly different from
liquidation in Chapter 7, (where individual assets are sold piecemeal and the company is rendered
a shell) or even voluntary liquidation in Chapter 11 (where parts of the company are voluntarily
sold to raise money to assist the debtor in reorganizing). Of course, voluntary auctions do occur
in Chapter 11. Baird cites the case of Financial News Network (FNN) which entered Chapter
30
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Ideally, this would move the assets to their most valued uses quickly and
inexpensively 56
A second group of commentators argues for implementation of a
predetermined bankruptcy capital structure by permitting firms to opt out of
bankruptcy. 7  According to these commentators, if Chapter 11 were
optional, debtors would devise their own alternatives to bankruptcy.5 8 For
instance, corporations could provide in their bylaws or contracts for a special
capital structure of preplanned adjustments that would be triggered by
insolvency.259
A third group of commentators suggests variations on the theory of
contingent or chameleon equity.' These commentators argue for automat-
ic cancellation of shareholder interests in the event of a corporate de-
fault. 6 Upon cancellation of shareholder interests, the next highest class
of claimants replace them as shareholders. 62  A benefit of automatic
cancellation is its effect on management incentives. Managers who cannot
look forward to the protection of Chapter 11 are less likely to gamble with
corporate assets. 263
Finally, at least one author advocates eliminating bankruptcy and
abandoning debtors and their assets to the state law collection system. 2' 4
James Bowers proposes such action in his article criticizing the creditors
bargain model.'
11 in 1991. A joint venture between Dow Jones and Group W offered to pay $90 million for
FNN's assets. NBC offered $115 million. The bankruptcy court ordered an auction of FNN's
assets. NBC eventually won with a bid of $146 million. Baird, Revisiting Auctions, supra note
31, at 634.
256. Id. Skeel, Brave New World, supra note 21, at 474.
257. Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy Workouts and Debt Contracts, 36 J. L. & ECON. 595 (1993);
Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX.
L. REv. 51 (1992).
258. See supra note 257. Under existing law, firms facing financial distress and wishing to
reorganize have Chapter 11 as their only option. Implementation of the predetermined
bankruptcy capital structure allows firms to "opt out' of Chapter 11 by providing in their charter
and/or contracts for planned events that would be triggered by financial distress. Moreover,
under this proposal, even firms that chose to "opt in" to Chapter 11 could specify by charter or
contract how specific provisions of Chapter II would apply. Skeel, Brave New World, supra
note 21, at 474-75.
259. See supra note 257; Skeel, Brave New World, supra note 21, at 474-75.
260. Barry E. Adler, Financial and Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy,
45 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993) [hereinafter Adler, Political Theories]; Bradley & Rosenzweig,
supra note 9; Skeel, Brave New World, supra note 21.
261. See supra note 260. It is envisioned that a firm in danger of defaulting on its
obligations will raise money by issuing equity. Only when the firm's liabilities exceed its assets,
and its stock has therefore become worthless, will the firm be unable to sell equity. The firm's
subsequent default will then reflect true insolvency thus justifying the elimination of its current
shareholders' interests. Skeel, Brave New World, supra note 21, at 475 (citing Bradley and
Rosenzweig, supra note 9, at 1081).
262. See supra note 260.
263. Skeel, Brave New World, supra note 21, at 476.
264. Bowers, supra note 241; Skeel, Brave New World, supra note 21, at 476.
265. Bowers, supra note 241.
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Each of the proposals to replace Chapter 11 is problematic. 2 Manda-
tory auctions would suffer from a lack of bidders and depressed prices.'
Choosing an insolvency capital structure in advance requires costly
negotiation and the ability to predict the future.' Chameleon equity
assumes the existence of perfect markets for the equity of insolvent corpora-
tions as well as the cooperation of managers subject to dismissal. 2'
Lastly, eliminating bankruptcy and abandoning debtors and creditors to their
state law rights encourages a costly race to the courthouse and the dismem-
berment of the debtor. 27O
D. Legislative Response
In response to the growing controversy surrounding Chapter 11, the
House and Senate Judiciary Committees agreed on a compromise bill that
would have amended several dozen sections of the Bankruptcy Code in
October 1992.27  However, the proposal never became law because the
House adjourned without voting on it.2' 2
On March 10, 1993, the Bankruptcy Improvements Act was introduced
by Senators Howell Heflin and Charles Grassley.2 3  The Bankruptcy
Improvements Act of 1993 limited the time in which a court might increase
the debtor's exclusive right to file a reorganization plan to one year unless
the court found the need for additional time was not due to circumstances
attributable to the debtor.274 It also created a nine member bankruptcy
review commission to investigate and study issues and problems related to
bankruptcy.275
On October 7 1994, Congress unexpectedly276 passed the Bankruptcy
266. For an in-depth analysis of the problems involved in applying each of the four proposed
Chapter 1 I alternatives see Skeel, Brave New World, supra note 21, at 476-94.
267. Skeel, Brave New World, supra note 21, at 477-78. Skeel also discusses and rejects the
options alternative to the mandatory auction proposal. Id at 479-81. LoPucki & Whitford,
Corporate Governance, supra note 3 1, at 756-767.
268. Skeel, Brave New World, supra note 21, at 482.
269. Id. at 483-91.
270. Id, at 492.
271. H.R. 6020, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 102 (1992); S. 1985, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 102
(1992).
272. Bienenstock, supra note 186, at 562 n.91.




276. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 was "unexpected" in its timing. H.R. 5116 was
passed by the House, by voice vote, at 6:00 p.m. on October 4, 1994. It was sent directly to the
Senate floor without a conference committee in order to beat the end of the 103rd Congressional
session. Just prior to its adjournment on October 7, 1994, the Senate passed H.R. 5116 also by
voice vote. Roger M. Whelan, "Yes Virginia, There is a Santa Claus" (And a New Bankruptcy
Bill): The Bankruptcy Reform Act qf 1994, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 402, 403 (1994).
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Reform Act of 1994.21 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 combines
many of the features of the Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1993 and the
1992 proposal of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. Like the
Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1993, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994
authorizes a nine member bankruptcy review commission."s However, it
provides for an immediate appeal of court orders extending the deadline for
debtor companies to file reorganization plans under Chapter 11, rather than
the one year limit on exclusivity found in the Bankruptcy Amendments Act
of 1993.279
IV. THE UNPROPOSED SOLUTION
A. Background
Although there has been a clamor for reform of Chapter 11, few of the
proposals are aimed at increasing management accountability within the
confines of Chapter 11.° The Bankruptcy Code fails today, not because
it was poorly drafted, but because Congress failed to anticipate today's
problems: the need to compete in an ever shrinking global economy and the
impact of bankruptcy legislation upon the ability to compete.
In contrast to Chapter 11, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People's
Republic of China ("PRC") was drafted in the 1980s by a nation attempting
to compete in a global economy for the first time. Its purpose is well
defined: to assist the PRC in developing a planned economy with market
mechanisms. In the PRC, bankruptcy legislation is viewed as a device for
implementing economic policy and encouraging management efficiency. The
punishment of management is seen as a method of imposing the pain of
losses resulting from bankruptcy on management and as providing the
discipline over management that would be exercised by shareholders actively
involved in the company.
Arguably, in a capitalist system the market should provide the function
of disciplining management without the need for legislation. However, a
corporation which files for relief under Chapter 11 is shielded from the
effects of the market. 2"8 Furthermore, under Chapter 11, a corporation can
277. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994)
278. Id. at Title VI.
279. Id. at Title I, § 104.
280. Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 9, and other proponents of contingent or chameleon
equity, hope to affect management incentives by replacing Chapter 11.
281. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988) automatically stays all collection efforts and foreclosure actions
upon the filing of a bankruptcy action. It also freezes and maintains the status quo among
creditors. Id. The Bankruptcy Reform Act provides for an expedited hearing on the automatic
stay. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994). However,
there are no plans for substantive revisions of section 362. Indeed, most bankruptcy legislation,
including that of the P.R.C., provides for an automatic stay. See, e.g., Enterprise Bankruptcy
Law, art. 11, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 84.
19941
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seek such protection from the market irrespective of its financial status and
may extend such protection indefinitely. Thus, corporate management is able
to take unnecessary risks with the assets of a corporation. When those risks
are successful they inure to the benefit of management, but when the risks
are unsuccessful they are spread among the creditor body.
What can be done? Elimination of Chapter 11 leaves management at
the mercy of the market. However, the cost-allowing a creditor race to the
courthouse-is great.
A comparison of Chapter 11 with the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law and the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 suggests the following methods of encouraging
responsible management through reform, rather than elimination, of Chapter
11: (1) strengthening the threshold requirements of Chapter 11; (2) limiting
the overall time for corporate reorganizations and the exclusive time for
filing a plan of reorganization; (3) exercising controls over corporate
management; and/or (4) applying sanctions against those members of
management who act irresponsibly.
B. Threshold Requirements
Under the Bankruptcy Code, unlike the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and the
Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the PRC, a voluntary bankruptcy filing does
not require any showing of insolvency or inability to pay debts as they
become due. As a result, a corporation may file for relief under Chapter 11
for almost any business reason, short of fraud, including mismanage-
ment. 2I In fact, mismanagement is believed to exist in most Chapter 11
filings. 2"
Several options are available to strengthen the threshold requirements of
the Bankruptcy Code. The first is to reinstate the requirement of insolvency
or the inability to pay debts for a bankruptcy filing. 2 This is similar to
the threshold requirement of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law.' However,
such a requirement is difficult to apply and discourages entities from filing
for Chapter 11.21
A second, preferable alternative is to reinstate the good faith requirement
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. This is a fluid test, which could be applied
282. See discussion supra Part II(E)(1).
283. See discussion supra Part II(E)(1).
284. See THOMAS JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 194-203 (1986)
(proposing the reinstatement of the insolvency requirement.)
285. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, art. 3, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 83. See
discussion supra Part I(F).
286. JACKSON, supra note 284, at 201-04 (arguing for application of the insolvency
requirement although recognizing that because so much is uncertain at the commencement of the
case the insolvency requirement is incapable of precise application); DELANEY, supra note 8, at
160-68 (describing six key tactics utilized by corporations to make themselves appear insolvent
and avoid dismissal under a good faith analysis).
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on an ad hoc basis by the bankruptcy court.' However, in order to
control abuse of Chapter 11, the concept of good faith would have to be
extended beyond the confines of current case law to include review of pre-
petition dealings by managers with creditors and other third parties.'
C. Reorganization and Exclusivity
Several options are also available to limit abuses of Chapter 11 by
limiting the time during which management has exclusive control of a
Chapter 11 debtor. First, a statutory cap could be imposed on the overall
time a debtor may remain in Chapter 11. Second, Congress could shorten
the exclusivity time or require a stronger showing for the extension of the
exclusivity period beyond 120 days. 2 9
Third, the first two alternatives could be combined, requiring the debtor
to file and confirm a plan within a prescribed period of time. For example,
Congress could require a plan of reorganization to be filed within 120 days
of the petition and to be confirmed within 610 days thereafter, thereby
limiting the overall period of protection under Chapter 11 to two years. The
time limits would be subject to extension only upon a showing, by clear and
convincing evidence, of extraordinary circumstances beyond the control of
the debtor, its managers or its counsel. This third option is similar to the
requirement of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law that an application to
reorganize must occur within three months of acceptance of the petition and
the reorganization may not last more than two years.29
D. Corporate Governance: Controlling Management
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, trustees were automatically appointed
for large, publicly held corporations.29 Similarly, the SEC was responsi-
ble for reviewing all plans of reorganization.2' These practices had the
advantage of controlling, if not eliminating, corporate managers. However,
such practices also discourage corporate managers from filing for bankrupt-
cy.
Several options, other than the automatic involvement of court appointed
287. See In re Eden Associates, 13 B.R. 578, 584 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding that the
concept of good faith is an elastic one which can be read into the statute on an ad hoc basis.)
288. See discussion supra Part II(C).
289. See LoPucki, Trouble, supra note 188 (proposing "preemptive cramdown" and limits
on the discretion of the judge to extend exclusivity); Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 32
(proposing "aggressive" limits on extensions of exclusivity).
290. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, art. 17, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 84-85.
See discussion supra Part I(F).
291. See discussion supra Part II(E)(1). While trustees may have hired old management to
actually run the company after a bankruptcy filing, the trustee provided control. See Warren,
Untenable Case, supra note 245, at 454 n.76.
292. 11 U.S.C. § 572 (1976) (repealed 1978). See discussion supra Parts II(A) and (E)(1).
1994]
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trustees and the SEC, are available to control corporate managers.'93 First,
Chapter 11 could be amended to provide for the appointment of a trustee
upon a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, of some management act
from which the court could infer that maximizing the value of the estate was
not management's goal.
Second, Congress could adopt legislation defining the fiduciary duties of
the managers of an insolvent or nearly insolvent corporation and amend
Chapter 11 to provide for the appointment of a trustee upon a showing, by
clear and convincing evidence, of a violation of those duties.2 " Such
legislation could require that fiduciaries exercise the due care, diligence and
skill as to affirmative and negative duties required of an ordinarily prudent
person in the conduct of his or her private affairs. More specifically, the law
could include the fiduciary duty to creditors not to commit corporate
waste. 296
E. Corporate Governance: Sanctioning Management
The most controversial method of encouraging responsible management
is to provide sanctions for those managers who prove irresponsible, e.g.,
those managers who think of their own gains before those of the estate. A
293. The Enterprise Bankruptcy Law does not require the appointment of a trustee. In most
proceedings, the government authority which files for readjustment is charged with overseeing
the reorganization. Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, art. 20, translated in YEARBOOK, supra note 26,
at 85. See discussion supra Part I(F).
294. Some courts have already held that a trustee may be appointed based on "loss of
confidence" when management has performed some act from which the court can infer that
maximizing value for creditors was not management's goal. See, e.g., In re Ionosphere Clubs,
Inc. 113 B.R. 164, 167 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (trustee appointed where creditors lost confidence
in management's stewardship of the business); In re Cardinal Indus., 109 B.R. 755, 765-68
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (trustee appointed after creditors gave debtor opportunity to direct
reorganization and lost confidence in management). Bienenstock, supra note 186, at 552 n.37
(encouraging creditor vigilance in moving for appointment of trustees and for limits on
exclusivity).
295. As Bienenstock notes, the Delaware Chancery Court has ruled that where a corporation
is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the
shareholders but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.
To illustrate its point, the court posed an intriguing situation. Assume a
corporation's sole asset is a $51 million judgment on appeal. There is a twenty-five
percent chance of affirmance, a seventy percent chance of a reduction to $4 million,
and a five percent chance of reversal. The sum of the probabilities times their
respective outcomes is $15.55 million. Finally, the corporation had liabilities of $12.5
million. Should the directors accept a settlement offer of $12.5 million? $17.5
million?
The court concluded the board of directors should accept any offer of $15.55
million or greater, but not lower.
Bienenstock, supra note 186, at 555 (citing Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe
Communications Corp., 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, 108 (Del Ch. Dec. 30, 1991)).
296. See Bienenstock, supra note 186, at 557.
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variety of civil sanctions could discourage irresponsible management.2 7
First, Congress could adopt legislation fining corporate managers found
liable of violating their fiduciary duties to the estate and/or committing an act
from which the court could infer that maximizing the value of the estate was
not their goal.29 Such legislation could provide a basis for requiring
managers to pay all or part of the corporate debt.'l
Second, Congress could adopt legislation which creates a presumption
that the insolvency of a corporation is due to a lack of activity and diligence
on the part of the managers." Such legislation could require managers to
pay all or part of the corporate debt.
Third, Congress could adopt legislation providing that managers found
liable of violating their fiduciary duties to the estate and/or committing an act
from which the court could infer that maximizing the value of the estate was
not their goal are presumed to be substantially unfit to serve in a similar
capacity for a designated period of time.30
F. Policy Considerations
As previously discussed, identifying the policies underlying the
Bankruptcy Code has been the source of numerous debates. At its core, the
Bankruptcy Code is a debt collection and asset distribution system.3°2
There are those who believe that the primary purpose of this system is to
enhance the collection efforts of creditors with state-defined property rights.
Under this view, all bankruptcy laws are to be tested by whether they
297. LoPucki and Whitford believe legislation should require that reorganization management
maximize the value of the estate. They propose a scheme of mandatory risk compensation
payments that reduce "unfortunate" distributional effects that can create incentives for classes to
oppose the maximization efforts. LoPucki and Whitford, Corporate Governance, supra note 31,
at 789-91.
298. Fining managers was included in the Opinion Solicitation Draft of the Enterprise
Bankruptcy Law at art. 55. See discussion supra Part I(G).
299. It may become more difficult to find corporate managers under this proposal.
Presumably, however, the managers will protect themselves with liability insurance and corporate
indemnification agreements. See Daniel H. Hogard, Liability of Directors of Chapter 11 Debtor
in Possession: "Don't Look Back Something May be Gaining on You 68 AM. BANK. L.J. 155,
162 (1994) (discussing the four layers of protection a director can rely on against personal
liability prior to Chapter 11); and robert M. Sedgwick, Outside Directors of Financially Troubled
Companies are at Risk Despite Traditional Layers of Protection, CORP. COaNs. WKLY., Oct. 9,
1991, at 5-8 (discussing problems encountered by directors post-bankruptcy filing).
300. This presumption certainly underlies the early drafts of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law,
but is not specifically spelled out. It does exist, however, in the bankruptcy laws of other
countries. See Mark M. Jaffe, Chapter 11 Strategies and Techniques, 59 TUL. L. REV. 1298(1985) (citing Article 99 of France's Bankruptcy Act of 1967).
301. Preventing managers from serving in a similar capacity was included in the Opinion
Solicitation Draft of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law at art 58. See discussion supra Part I(G).
A similar provision already exists for managers found guilty of securities fraud. Lagne W.
Barnard, When is a Corporate Executive Substantially Unfit to Serve, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1489(1992) (discussing the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Perry Stock Reform Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990)).
302. See discussion supra Part II(B).
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enhance or diminish the creditors' collective benefits.' There are others
who argue that the system is an attempt to reckon with a debtor's multiple
defaults and to distribute the consequences. Under this view, bankruptcy
policy becomes a "composite of factors that bear on a better answer to the
question 'How shall the losses be distributed.' 
3 4
One of the first tasks of the bankruptcy review commission should be to
define the policies underlying reform of the Bankruptcy Code. Articulation
of bankruptcy policy will affect how bankruptcy issues are posed and
solved.' It will also allow a comprehensive review of the system. As
one commentator has written, "a clearer articulation of bankruptcy policy
does not tell us if the policy has been effectively implemented, but it does
identify the normative goals that are critical in deeming the system a
success .... " 306
In formulating a comprehensive bankruptcy policy, the bankruptcy
review commission should review the administration of bankruptcy cases
with an emphasis on social and economic effects as well as the resolution of
debtor-creditor disputes. As posited by this article, one policy to be
considered is that of fostering efficient management of publicly owned
companies by increasing management accountability and encouraging
responsible management decisionmaking.
If bankruptcy policy is to focus on the question of how to distribute
losses, then the policy of encouraging corporate efficiency by promoting
management accountability is consistent with that policy. The concepts that:
(1) management should not be able to utilize the Bankruptcy Code to shield
itself from the financial effects of risky behavior to the detriment of other
interested parties; (2) management should not retain control of a corporation
under the protection of the Bankruptcy Code where it has evidenced that
maximizing the value of the estate is not its primary goal; and (3) the
financial effects of risky behavior should be borne by the persons responsible
for incurring them, all relate to the prevention and the allocation of loss.
CONCLUSION
Chapter 11 was designed to maximize assets by discouraging the
dismantling of corporations and encouraging the ongoing involvement of
management. However, the very sections of the Bankruptcy Code that were
intended to preserve assets through the involvement of management,
encourage management to take unnecessary risks. Such risks, when
successful, inure to the benefit of management. Unfortunately, when such
303. Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations, supra note 229, at 103.
304. Warren, Policy, supra note 23, at 777.
305. Warren, Imperfect World, supra note 23, at 373.
306. Id. at 377. See also, Donald R. Korobkin, Contractarianism and the Normative
Foundations of Bankruptcy Law, 71 TEx. L. REv. 541 (1993).
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risks prove unsuccessful, they are spread among the creditor body and,
ultimately, society at large.
It is time to reform Chapter 11 to implement economic policy which
encourages the survival of viable corporations by encouraging responsible
management. Pending legislation proposes a bankruptcy review commission
to consider large-scale reform of Chapter 11. Such a commission could
easily consider the alternatives outlined above as well as those suggested by
an examination of the bankruptcy legislation of other developing countries
seeking to thrive in a global economy.' There is little to lose and much
to gain.
307. The P.R.C. is only one of several countries which may impose management
responsibility for business failures. For example, France and Belgium both impose officer and
director liability in bankruptcy. Klaus J. Hopt, New Ways in Corporate Governance: European
Experiments with Labor Representation on Corporate Boards, 82 MIcH. L. REv. 1338 (1984);
Jaffe, supra note 276. Yugoslavia has a similar law. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory &
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